The Integration of Traditional leaders The Democratization Process by Omer, Rabah Ali
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2009
The Integration of Traditional leaders The
Democratization Process
Rabah Ali Omer
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Omer, Rabah Ali, "The Integration of Traditional leaders The Democratization Process" (2009). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
10658.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/10658
A case study of the integration of traditional leaders in the democratization process  
in Sudan 
 
by 
 
Rabah Ali Omer 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
 
Major:  Political Science 
 
Program of Study Committee: 
Kathleen G. Cunningham, Major Professor 
David E. Cunningham 
Robert B. Urbatsch 
 
 
 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
2009 
 
Copyright © Rabah Ali Omer, 2009. 
 ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This research was made possible, thanks to my major professor, Dr. Kathleen 
Cunningham. I am sincerely grateful for her insightful guidance. Appreciation and sincere 
thanks is also due to the crucial support received from Dr. Robert Urbatsch. I am also 
grateful to Dr. David Cunningham for his collaboration and constructive contributions. 
 
 
 iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ABSTRACT  iv 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 
 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 3 
 
CHAPTER 3. THEORY 8 
 
CHAPTER 4. CHRONOLOGICAL STUDY 20 
 
CHAPTER 5. JABARONA CAMP FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE 64 
 
CHAPTER 6. LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES 77 
 
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 81 
 
APPENDIX A.  DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE CAMP 86 
 
APPENDIX B. PHOTOS 89 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 98 
  
  
 iv 
ABSTRACT  
Governance is a common problem in African countries wherein it manifests itself in 
various phenomena, such as authoritarian rules, conflict, civil wars, poverty, and 
unemployment. The research studied to tackle this problem addressed issues on the central 
governmental level in terms of constitutional and institutional arrangements. Sudan is one of 
the most complicated cases of governance in Africa considering its long history of civil wars 
and dictatorships.  
Using Sudan as a case, this study addressed the issue of governance in traditional 
communities and rural areas. The study focused on the emphasis on popular participation and 
civic engagement as measures to guarantee representation and equal distribution of 
developmental efforts. It was posited that the integration of the traditional leaders in a 
national structure would increase popular participation and, thereby, strengthen 
representation in traditional communities and rural areas.  
Using political science and anthropological paradigms, a longitudinal analysis was 
undertaken to examine the evolution of traditional leaders in Sudan and their influence on 
socio-political dynamics. The study traced traditional leaders and their relationship with the 
central authority, and the impact of their role in the socio-political dynamics of the society 
from pre-colonialism and colonialism through post-colonialism. The Jabarona camp for 
internally displaced people was investigated to ascertain how traditional leaders influenced 
events within the camp and social issues were handled. This study also explored selected 
Africans’ experiences with traditional leaders to draw lessons for Sudan. 
It was concluded that traditional leaders are important for integration within a national 
structure. Such leaders are able to strengthen representation of the rural communities by 
promoting popular participation at the local and national and motivate inter-communal 
interaction for nation-building and stability purposes. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
The ubiquitous phenomena of civil wars, conflicts, violence, and poverty in Africa 
have brought forth questions regarding political order and crises of governance that prevail 
on the continent. Efforts made to address these issues have taken different avenues of 
investigation. Some researchers emphasize political strategies at high levels of government, 
such as power sharing and the ethnicity of leaders. Some focus on economic and 
development issues, whereas others espouse that the legacy of colonialism has had the 
greatest share in causing wars and conflict in Africa. These efforts are important in 
addressing the democratization process because they highlight some of the problems that 
need to be resolved.   
Within this context, Sudan has been considered one of Africa’s most complicated 
cases due to a variety of crises and dilemmas. Sudan is frequently referred to as a microcosm 
of Africa because of its geographic, cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic composition 
wherein all of Africa’s features are present in the Sudan. Considering its political record, 
Sudan can also be considered as representative of Africa due to its experiences with the 
longest civil war, armed conflicts, coups, and dictatorships. Therefore, regarding the gravity 
of the current situation in Sudan and other African countries, research on the democratization 
process may be considered as an urgent necessity.  
When addressing the issue of governance in Africa in general and Sudan in particular, 
most efforts emphasize peace agreements, constitutional arrangements, and other 
developmental issues. Despite these endeavors, Africa generally and Sudan specifically, pose 
a challenging question and generate doubts about the possibility of eventually achieving 
political stability. Yet, these existing efforts to explain the potential for democratic stability 
have overlooked the social and cultural foundations for political stability and democracy 
present in this region. Specifically, most of the research in this area does not consider 
traditional leadership as a possible subject for political change and social engagement. This is 
surprising considering the socio-cultural traits of Sudan in particular and Africa in general, 
where traditional leaders have had a powerful influence on local communities throughout 
history. The socio-cultural influence has assumed different appearances according to diverse 
situations, but the compelling fact is that traditional leaders exert a significant socio-cultural 
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influence. When addressing Africa’s situation, analysts often look for elements that have 
made stories of Western countries. However, when these elements are not found, Africa is 
considered a puzzle or a continent with inherent factors of failure. Studies of Africa have also 
ignored democratic practices and libertarian traditions that have existed in Africa centuries 
before penetration by colonial expeditions.  
In this study, the researcher proposes that traditional leaders should be considered for 
the democratization process to achieve sustainable peace and political stability. The research 
intended to ascertain whether traditional leaders’ integration in the democratization process 
will increase popular political participation, which is a critical element for democracy and its 
sustainability. Popular participation was targeted as the vehicle for achieving nation-building 
and stability. It is important to note that the integration of traditional leaders does not refer to 
tribal politics; nor does it indicate power sharing on ethnic bases, which can lead to 
fractionalization. Rather, traditional leaders are considered as participants in a national 
project of democratization and nation building. More importantly, this study also moves 
beyond the use of electoral participation as a single indicator and guarantor of popular 
participation and, thus, representation in a democracy. Instead, this researcher emphasizes a 
number of ways that citizens can engage in representative government through networks of 
civil activism. In doing so, Sudan is used as a case addressing social-cultural influence in a 
longitudinal study through history to examine the roles of traditional leaders and the 
possibility of their integration of a national governance structure. The Jabarona camp for 
internally displaced people is also examined to verify whether this importance is limited to 
the communities of origin or if it is an ingrained component of their identities. Subsequently, 
some African experiences with traditional leaders are explored to draw lessons regarding 
Sudan’s future. The study concludes by restating the theory, presenting the findings, and 
offering recommendations for practical application.   
 3 
CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several political studies of African nations have made attempts to explain the political 
order, and ubiquitous conflicts and violence. Scholars have taken varied avenues in their 
efforts to disentangle the major causes and contributing factors to this phenomenon. In his 
study “States and Power in Africa,” Herbst (2000) offered a rich analysis of African politics, 
which is especially significant because it provides a historical background of the African 
story. In this historical narrative, Herbst (35-37) pointed out that the disperse populations and 
vast distances separating them contributed to the concept of power and state in pre-colonial 
Africa. He added that the legacy of colonialism forced many leaders to confront enormous 
challenges to keep their state boundaries intact. This contrasted with pre-colonialism rule 
(Herbst:97-136). Moreover, Herbst indicated the importance of African traditional leaders’ 
influence. He argued regarding the irony of sovereignty in African states whereby central 
authorities embraced the notion of sovereignty while the local leaders were the actual holders 
of control over the land (Herbst:139-197).  
Herbst’s (2000) account of politics in Africa made significant addition to the study of 
African politics by considering traditional leaders as political players. However, he did not 
indicate a path that political actors might follow in order to consolidate states in Africa and 
promote democratic rule. This path was open for other researchers to pursue.   
Addressing the issue of governance in Africa, Mamdani (1996) emphasized the gap 
between rural areas and urban centers. Mamdani conducted a diagnostic analysis to explain 
how the legacy of colonialism produced this gap. He espoused that African governments are 
trapped in this legacy and, as a result, face a paramount quandary regarding rural-urban 
contradictions. Mamdani argued the attempts to achieve reform in Africa would be fruitless 
unless this gap was addressed, and used historical narratives to demonstrate how this gap 
contributed to governance problems in Africa. The point that Mamdani made is significant 
since it sheds light on and offers a diagnosis regarding part of the dilemma of governance and 
development in Africa. However, Mamdani did not offer a direction to practically address 
this dilemma.  
Studies on democratization have examined how formal institutions influence the 
relationship between politics and government. In his book, “Making Democracy Work: Civic 
 4 
Tradition in Modern Italy,” Putnam (1993:8) studied the development and evolution of 
regional institutions in Italy, focusing on cultural and political environments. Putnam 
suggested that government institutions receive inputs from their social environment and 
produce outputs to respond to that environment (9). He added that each institution affects the 
ways in which individuals and groups become politically activated within and outside the 
institution (17). Putnam also showed that the support for and cooperation with the national 
government in Italy was bought about by adjustments in national policy to suit local 
coalitions or, at least, to suit the locally powerful individuals. Putnam (38) pointed that the 
prefects, though responsible for controlling the local governments, were also responsible for 
conciliating traditional local elites. He noted that the effects of involvement in regional 
government were that the ideological intransigence was being supplanted by appreciation of 
compromise and technical expertise. Putnam argued that the vibrant civic traditions in some 
parts of Italy where they are dense social networks with traditions of reciprocity and 
cooperation contributed to the success in its government institutions. Putnam also argued that 
norms of social collaboration built on trust, tolerance, and widespread citizen participation 
involving “norms and networks of social engagement” (90) were essential to democracy.  
The importance of Putnam’s study is that Putnam (1993) revealed that the social and 
cultural bases must be taken into account in democratization process. He also pointed out that 
the institutional socialization transforms individuals’ identities into more engaged altruistic 
and concerned-with-public-issues individuals. Nevertheless, Putnam’s study did not indicate 
how to build institutions based on these cultural traditions of cooperation. Putnam indicated 
the importance of the cultural traditions, but he did not expound on how to utilize them to 
guarantee the success of the institutions.  
In “Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Warm,” Roeder and 
Rothschild (2005) discussed the critical elements for achieving stability and sustainability 
after the civil war. They focused on the constitutional arrangements and the functionality of 
different branches of the government. The authors espoused that dividing-power 
arrangements are more likely to deter the escalation of ethnic conflict to ethno-national crisis. 
They suggested that power-dividing institutions guarantee the rights of ethnic groups and 
other groups through universalistic private and associational lives. In their book, Roeder and 
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Rothschild indicated that, in the power-sharing form of governance, the leaders generally 
make all the issues ethnic in nature which destabilizes the government and democracy. They 
argued that power-dividing is a compelling form of democracy that leads to sustainability. In 
addition, this form empowers all the majorities instead of one majority and empowers the 
civil society’s institutions and their roles in democracy, individual liberties against 
governmental intrusion.  
Although Roeder and Rothschild (2005) made a noteworthy contribution to studies on 
peace and democratization, their account did not explain how to build democratic institutions 
on the local level. They failed to take into consideration the cultural and social basis of civic 
tradition and cooperation norms. Moreover, they maintained that ethnic groups were key 
political players in the realm of government and administration. This reasoning led to 
consolidated ethnic identity and brought about imminent risk to peace and stability of the 
society. 
In a key work on explaining Africa’s political performance, Bates (2008) made a 
particularly noteworthy contribution with “When Things Fell Apart,” which highlights the 
importance of public revenues, democratization and natural resources, and the manner in 
which they influence the possibilities for political order. Bates (33-53) argued that African 
political elites reconfigured African political institutions in their search for wealth and power, 
and transformed them from multi-party to single- or no-party systems or even replacing 
civilian governments with military regimes. Bates (54-74) noted that the authoritarian elites 
availed themselves of resources which enabled them to recruit clients and build political 
machines and, thereby, remain in power. Bates (129-139) also negated the assumption that 
Africa’s political failure is attributed to its high ethnic heterogeneity and suggested ethnic 
tensions can be attributed to the state failure.  
Bates (2008) accounted for the critical factors that generally contribute to the political 
phenomenon worldwide. The drawbacks of his account are that he overlooked the legacy of 
colonialism and its role on setting the bases for political failures in Africa. Bates (93) also 
noted that the African societies at the local level have the natural features of bearing the 
political disorder. This is, at best, an arbitrary conclusion about complicated situations 
wherein armed conflict has objective causes and historical conditions as contributors. Bates 
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overlooked the positive socio-cultural features of these societies which can bear the seeds for 
cooperation and collective positive engagement. In addition, Bates did not indicate the means 
to build democratic institutions, and a link from the grassroots level with the government was 
not clear in his assessment.  
Wolf (1999) provided a comprehensive account of how power relations are built on 
cultural basis. In his book, “Envisioning Power: Ideologies and Dominance and Crisis,” he 
explained how cultures and ideas inform the political structure throughout history. Wolf 
espoused that social arrangements and political process are historically conditioned, and 
determined by cultures and ideas. He made a strong case for the abiding value of the concept 
of culture—where ideas and power intersect, and power is manifested through symbolic 
expression. Wolf (2) stated that “structural power implicate ideas and are played out in social 
arrangements and cultural configurations.” His rich anthropological analysis accounted for 
the materialistic and ideational factors in power relations.  
Wolf’s (1999) study laid the foundation for tackling the political structure and power 
relations within a cultural context along with other historical factors, and confirmed that 
values, norms and ideas are critical in determining the social arrangement of a society. 
Furthermore, the study emphasized the salience of individuals as the agency that determines 
the use of cultural traits to promote power relations and social arrangements. In the current 
study of democratization in Africa, the implication of culture on power relations and political 
order was considered as important as other factors.   
Although the aforementioned studies made significant attempts to explain African 
political problems, they failed to indicate specific ways to tackle Africa’s governance 
dilemmas in a practical sense. For example, the studies did not offer a plan for initiating 
democratic governments that provide solutions for governance and development at local 
levels. They also failed to take into account the cultural contexts and social systems in 
African politics. More specifically, they ignored the role of traditional leaders and their 
significant influence on their communities. Previous accounts also failed to consider the 
positive role that belief systems and socio-cultural values play in African politics. The 
current study explored the potentialities of integrating traditional leaders in the 
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democratization process. It also explored the socio-cultural values that could potentially have 
a positive contribution in the democratization process in Africa.  
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CHAPTER 3.  THEORY 
The democratic system is built on the pillars of representation, participation, and 
institutional rules of accountability and transparency. The power of democracy is derived 
from its legitimacy as it is established on the will of the people and emerges from their socio-
cultural norms. A democracy sustains these norms while allowing room for innovation and 
freedom of exercise and expression. Guaranteeing “representation” in a democracy is a 
challenging task in a governance system, especially from a structural point of view. This is 
especially true in societies that include wide ranges of differences among communities that 
include traditional, non-traditional, and plural cultural and social groups. It becomes even 
more challenging in fledgling democracies in societies that have had a history of civil war 
and conflicts while dealing with legacies of colonialism and dictatorships. These challenges 
emerge from the fact that, in the pluralist societies, the sources of legitimacy vary from one 
communal setting to another. This is also true for the varying types of power centers based 
on the socio- cultural and economic factors within each of these communities. Thus, to meet 
the “representation” condition in a pluralist society that has experienced a long history of 
conflict, dictatorships, and a legacy of colonialism, it is imperative to investigate traditional 
communities and their leadership, and determine how they can be integrated in the 
democratization process based on democratic rule. 
A major foundational point in my theory is that traditional communities should be 
treated as integrated wholes of inseparable parts wherein the organization of the community 
is established based on socio-cultural values and norms that are shaped by the physical 
environment of the community and its historical experience. These socio-cultural values and 
norms are interactively related to the economic activities and spiritual belief system of the 
community. Thus, the social organization of the community is established on and is a product 
of the socio-cultural system that serves to sustain it. In other words, social organization takes 
place in the environmental and economic platform of the community, and is both shaped and 
shaped by it. Therefore, traditional communities must be considered as webs of complex and 
dynamically interactive cultural, spiritual, economic, and organizational components. Hence, 
in traditional communities, the political and social authorities reside on socio-cultural 
systems that allocate power and decision-making responsibility on individuals perceived to 
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have spiritual or cultural legitimacy. Based on this premise, and as an implication of this 
author’s theory, when tackling issues of governance or development, it is futile to address 
power relations in isolation from this interconnected web of multiple aspects of traditional 
communities. Likewise, it is ineffectual to address economic activities separately from other 
social and cultural features of traditional communities. Rather, it is productive to interpret 
these communities according to their complexity and grasp how their various aspects interact 
to influence one another and how, collectively, these factors produce the community’s 
dynamics.  
Since traditional leaders are involved in different types of social processes and exert 
significant influence on their communities, they must be part of the democratization process. 
Considering traditional leadership in the democratization process serves many functions that 
lead to increase in popular participation and, ultimately, nation-building. These functions are 
discussed as follows. First, channeling the power and influence of traditional leaders in 
democratic institutions enables the introduction of institutional practices in local 
communities. This will be witnessed in formal organizations and committees promoted and 
supported by traditional leaders to carry out specified tasks and face issues while embracing 
institutional rules. It ensures optimal ways of solving social and economic problems, and 
promotes positive engagement in public issues. Second, if the influence of traditional leaders 
is channeled into institutionalized democratic forms, it can lead to linking people at the 
grassroots level to the central authorities. This must be manifested in two important ways, by: 
(a) cooperating with the central authority while engaging in national issues, and (b) 
demanding the central authority serves local aims. Both elements are necessary for a 
successful democracy, since they promote popular participation based on identification with 
a legitimate central authority. Third, organizing traditional leaders into local forms of 
institutions will transform their influence into a formal institutionalized platform instead of a 
casual context-based form, thereby introducing measures of accountability, transparency and 
systematic review. This would deepen democratic rule into the culture, thereby making it 
sustainable. Fourth, the integration of traditional leaders in a national structure will 
accentuate the cultural diversity and ethnic pluralism of the society which makes it an 
obligatory fact to be considered by the central authority in its conduct. It fortifies the 
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representational power of democracy and leads it to an equal distribution of social 
development. Fifth, co-existence of traditional leaders in a national structure will facilitate 
inter-communal communication and cultural exchange as a means for nation-building. It 
enables a nation-building process that embraces unity in diversity according to the values of 
recognition and respect.  
In addition, acknowledging and emphasizing cultural diversity by the integrated 
traditional leaders will serve nation-building by fostering national cultural identity. Involving 
the leaders of these institutions in training and capacity building programs will enable them 
to acquire skills of conflict resolution, resources management, and other managerial and 
communication tools which will benefit their local communities. Thus, the ultimate product 
of integrating traditional leaders in a national structure will ensure a public who is active at 
the local level and engaged in issues on the national level, and tackles problems in a 
democratic manner under a unified national cultural identity that embraces diversity. 
Engaging traditional leaders in the democratization process sows the foundation for peace 
and stability built upon a culturally-based democracy that is sustainable.  
Contrary to the aforementioned proposition, some analysts have espoused that 
traditional leaders serve as hindering obstacles regarding democratic rule. In response to this 
allegation, it should be noted that traditional leaders have long held a positive role which can 
contribute to the democratization process which existed a long time before the notion of 
democratic systems. Their positive influence has continued to the present, despite deliberate 
or non-deliberate attempts throughout history to eliminate them. This positive role is 
observed in their skill to lead local communities by managing issues, solving problems, and 
representing their cultural symbolism. These skills should be recognized as stabilizing inputs 
with the potential to capitalize on for promoting democracy and nation-building. Involving 
traditional leaders promotes the public’s participation on the local level and facilitates their 
engagement on a national level. Moreover, and contrary to what has been promoted, by 
building democratic institutions on the existing cultural basis, the probability for 
sustainability and stability of society will be higher than when traditional leadership and the 
cultural basis are eliminated. When traditional leaders are left out of the democratization 
process, potential sources of legitimacy as well as power of representation and mobilization 
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are greatly diminished. If Traditional communities were excluded from the political process 
or marginalized in regards to economic development. The results may lead to poverty and 
engagement in conflict or failure of the citizens to engage in the local institutions, a fact that 
undermines the democratic rule itself. If traditional leaders are successfully incorporated in a 
national structure, institutions at the local level have the potential to prevent conflict, while 
optimizing human and natural resources to serve the socio-political and economic 
development of the local community. This, in turn, will enable the nation to achieve stability 
and economic development at the national level. The integration of traditional leaders also 
serves as a way to bring about diversity of the local to the national, thereby promoting a 
unified national self-image which invests in its multiplicity and pluralism. Thus, instead of 
excluding traditional leaders, who are symbolic of their respective cultures, they should be 
targeted as tools to promote a national cultural identity through their representation in a 
structure that facilitates dialectic relations between local and national , as well as among 
different local communities.  
Why Traditional Leaders? 
To build a sustainable democracy that consolidates peace and stability, it should be 
well-rooted in the social traditions of the society, and its institutions must be culturally-based 
when among existing sources of political authority. This is because the legitimacy of 
democratic rule is driven and sustained, by necessity, from cultural values and resembles a 
structural manifestation to it. Hence, acknowledging cultural values that promote popular 
participation and activism for collective good while enhancing the social norms for handling 
social issues are part of the democratization process. Incorporating traditional leadership in 
the democratization process contributes to the criteria of representation and legitimacy while 
eliminating the possibility of excluding integral members of the society from their input in 
governance. This is especially important in pluralist societies and countries with ailing 
government, civil war and conflict. Moreover, traditional leaders are vital as active members 
in new political institutions to guarantee the government is responsive to its constituents by 
fostering feedback mechanisms between government and the public.  
Furthermore, traditional communities, such as those in the Nuba Mountains, the 
nomads of Kordofan, the southern-Sudanese tribal communities, and the tribal groups of 
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eastern Sudan, have solid social networks which are essential for collaboration. These social 
networks are a readily existing social capital to invest in for democratization and institution 
building. These social networks are manifested in family ties wherein both the immediate and 
extended family have a collective responsibility to the wellbeing of its members. Social 
networks are comprised of frequent and regular gatherings for celebrations and ceremonial 
activities. They also convene to solve problems of a collective or individual concern. These 
types of social networks are also manifested in neighborhood ties where people have a 
significant collective sense of responsibility toward each other. They confer to solve 
problems and manage their neighborhood issues. Some areas have organized forms of social 
entities to help the needy, meet the needs of social occasions and solve disputes. Some of 
these forms include membership groups such as youth, women, community elders, and sports 
clubs. The social networks also include general contacts and friends where there are 
remarkably strong ties and a common sense of solidarity. These social networks generally 
have an informal relationship with local traditional leaders of the community. It is informal 
because there is no official obligation put upon them by members of the community. Rather, 
these social networks draw their legitimacy from the social traditions, cultural norms, and 
values of the society. Relationships are built upon mutual respect, trust, and a collective 
sense of responsibility. The dynamics of these social networks are especially strong during 
times of crises, loss, danger, and need. Hence, social networks along with their cultural value 
bases should be considered a rich potential to capitalize on when promoting popular 
participation and projecting nation-building programs.  
In new and developing democracies, these social networks can be mobilized and 
directed toward more public participatory roles to place demands on the government by 
voicing each community’s interests and concerns. The traditional leaders in these 
communities have a significant level of trust placed on them by their people. They also have 
the ability to direct behavior and decisions, especially regarding interaction with other 
communities. Traditional leaders exercise their influence by engaging in activities such as 
solving disputes and managing resources, or by acting as charismatic role models in the 
community. They often employ cultural tools, such as poetry, songs, rituals, stories and 
proverbs, to disseminate and maintain the socio-cultural values of the community. Investing 
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in social capital through traditional leaders promotes public participation and deepens the 
democratic process within the culture which guarantees its sustainability. Traditional leaders 
accept their role in a new democracy because of the responsibility already placed on them by 
their community. This responsibility provides traditional leaders with power and, at the same 
time, compels them to maintain culture and tradition. That is, the dialectic relationship 
between the community and their leaders is established and maintained by the culture which 
serves as a framework to assert the role of their leaders. Additionally, involving traditional 
leaders in institutions impacts their behavior and how they influence their communities. As 
espoused by institutionalists, institutions shape politics by impacting the social structure and 
behavior. When traditional leaders, themselves, are part of institutions, they promote the 
rules and procedures of an organization as well as democratic practices. As part of the 
democratization process, while influencing their communities, traditional leaders support 
democracy and promote popular participation according to civic rules. 
Incentives to resist 
It is expected that some traditional leaders may have incentives to resist integration in 
a democratic national structure. This might be due to a number of reasons. First, traditional 
leaders might resist integration due to the notion that integration in a national structure would 
undermine their power and diminish their influence on their own communities. In this regard, 
it should be emphasized that integration, when implemented, should not limit this power of 
traditional leaders; rather, it should exploit this power not only to benefit of the community 
but also to enhance the legitimacy of the state. In a way, integration will enhance traditional 
power and provide it with additional legitimacy. To elucidate, the legitimacy of the central 
authority and the legitimacy of the traditional authority should be conceived as symbiotic as 
they are in a mutual and interactive relationship, relying on one another while fortifying each 
other. Second, traditional leaders are expected to resist integration if the central state is not 
considerate of local concerns, and seeks to control or assimilate traditional communities 
rather than represent them. This necessitates embracing democratic conduct in the content of 
the democratic governance rather than limiting it only to its structure. That is, one must 
acknowledge the diversity of the society and allow sufficient latitude for traditional 
communities to exercise their individuality and cultural groups’ rights through policies that 
 14 
protect and meet basic needs for their livelihood. This is as opposed to superficially 
incorporating traditional leaders in positions in the national system without regard to the 
quality of governance or benefit to local communities. Third, traditional leaders are expected 
to resist if the central authority imposes a foreign structure, rules, or parallel leaders either to 
control communities or to “modernize” them according to the central authority’s own 
interpretation of modernization or “positive” change. Therefore, it is important to ensure that 
the structure and rules are not harming their lives by dealing heedlessly with norms and 
values of the traditional communities. The power structure and leaders of traditional 
communities are extensions of the socio-cultural system and a complementary part of the 
integrated whole. Imposing leadership by the central authority would lead to expulsion, and 
would destabilize traditional communities while undermining the governance system.  
It has also been argued that traditional leaders pose challenges to democracy and its 
institutions because traditional leaders represent a different type of authority, wherein they 
are considered “traditional” and the democratic authority is considered “rational” according 
to Max Weber’s categorization of authority. I argue the relevance of this point when 
traditional leaders, along with their authorities, are excluded or neglected from the political 
process. Further elaboration on this point, it is imperative to address local communities as a 
whole of inseparable parts wherein the social, cultural, and organizational intricately interact 
with the economical, environmental, and spiritual to produce a community with its dynamics. 
Thus, when attempting social change in the direction of democratic rule, it is paramount to 
address communities as woven webs with the whole as the sum of interconnected parts. 
Hence, to achieve a desirable change, it is critical to avoid projecting structures and rules in 
which power centers represented by traditional leaders are excluded or bypassed to design 
arrangements according to what is dictated by theoretical abstracts apart from the realities of 
these communities. This includes imposing a worldview that is foreign to a traditional 
community, assuming the community should adopt it because it is a righteous worldview for 
them. Therefore, I assume that traditional leaders will not hinder democracy if they are 
acknowledged and seriously considered as an integral part of the political institutions. 
Traditional leaders will enhance democracy if they are approached to partake in the 
democratization process since they already wield power withn their communities. That is 
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because they would supply power within a democrary with greater legitimacy as 
representatives of their respective traditions. Traditional leaders would also contribute 
significant quality to democracy by activating the citizens—an essential factor in a 
democracy. They would also serve as valuable sources for cultural values and social norms 
that encourage collective activism and celebrate positive public engagement. 
Therefore, and based on the previous discussion, I put forth that the attitude of the 
central authority toward traditional leaders as power centers is a critical factor when 
determining the reaction of traditional leaders regarding the democratization process and the 
attempts to integrate them in a national structure. Thus, if the central authority is more 
permissive and constructive toward traditional institutions, traditional leaders will be more 
cooperative and productive in the democratization process.   
Accordingly, traditional leaders should be consulted on policymaking and decisions 
that impact their communities. They should also be contacted to negotiate in conflict 
resolution and peace agreement efforts. To achieve a systematic role, traditional leaders 
should have specific roles within local institutions that provide public goods in terms of 
political representation, policy making, basic services, and security issues. For example, the 
traditional courts and councils that  set up in camps for internally displaced persons around 
Khartoum. Traditional leaders and leaders from different communities should also be 
involved in deliberating social issues. Thus, local leaders should be relied upon to negotiate 
intra-community matters which would then be channeled to the government. The process 
would include their opinions and decisions as well as the concerns of the citizens. Traditional 
leaders should also be considered for programs of capacity building on issues of governance, 
nation-building, democracy and their roles within the entire country. To enhance the process 
of traditional leaders’ integration and to cultivate the optimum outcomes, it is useful to 
examine the experiences of other countries that have endeavored to incorporate traditional 
institutions in their governance systems. For example, accounts from Botswana, Namibia, 
Nigeria, and South Africa may shed light on the positive and negative outputs to project the 
feasibility of democratization in Sudan. 
The subjects of this thesis research include traditional communities that are defined as 
socially organized according to common local cultural traditions and beliefs, and are 
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generally led by consultation of a traditionally appointed leader. It is also useful to illustrate 
communities that are not traditional. Whereas non-traditional communities include 
neighborhoods and local councils that are administered by officially and centrally appointed 
leaders who belong to provincial or regional councils, traditional communities have locally 
selected traditional leaders based on common cultural knowledge. Although non-traditional 
neighborhoods have social networks and socio-cultural traditions similar to those of 
traditional communities, they differ in the way they are socially organized and led. Non-
traditional neighborhoods are ethnically, culturally and, sometimes, religiously 
heterogeneous, while traditional communities are basically homogenous. Non-traditional 
neighborhoods usually occupy urban centers, whereas traditional communities occupy rural 
areas. These factors lead to variation in the types of economic activities and other forms of 
social enterprise between traditional communities and non-traditional ones. The influence of 
traditional leaders on their communities is basically exerted through consultation and advice 
via common language, values, and norms. Traditional leaders use their power and influence 
on their communities to encourage and support popular participation. Therefore, they could 
also direct the people’s efforts and organize them to work for their communities through 
political institutions as a part of democratization process.  
This set of theoretical propositions lead to the following hypothesis: If the 
democratization process integrates traditional leadership, it will increase popular 
participation which would ultimately contribute to nation-building and stability.  
Analytical Tools 
An analysis of traditional leaders’ potential roles in a national structure encompass 
the following aspects: their socio-political roles examining their relation with both the local 
community and the central authority. It also examines traditional leaders’ sources of 
legitimacy and how it maintained. Additionally, the analysis addresses the type of socio-
cultural organization in which traditional leaders and their communities reside. Finally, the 
study discusses the influence traditional leaders have on the public and the outcomes of that 
influence.  
Sudan is applied in a case study of the integration of traditional leaders in the 
democratization process using longitudinal analysis to investigate the theory in different 
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historical periods: pre-colonialism, colonialism, and post-colonialism. In each period I will 
examine the importance of traditional leaders, the sources of their legitimacy, their roles and 
achievements, and the attitude of the central authority towards them and how that impacted 
them. I will also explore the general social organization of traditional communities. Then I 
will investigate Jabarona camp for internally displaced people to examine popular 
participation before and after displacement, and the role of traditional leaders in directing the 
activities in the camp. Thereafter, I will explore some African countries’ experiences in 
regard to the integration of traditional institutions in the governance system. Longitudinal 
cases are studied to determine the importance of traditional leaders in the socio-political 
processes undergone in the country. It is also studied to illustrate the evolution of the 
traditional leadership in Sudan to understand the present socio- political reality. This research 
also considers the role and influence of traditional leaders through a longitudinal study to 
envision their potential roles if integrated in a national structure. An attempt will be made to 
explain the evolution of traditional leaders through history and changes in their roles, 
legitimacy, and organization. More importantly, the study traces the evolution and dynamics 
of traditional leaders and their relationships with the central authority and how these factors 
influenced their roles and their relation with their communities.   
The analysis also traces the shifts that occurred in the power centers in terms of their 
nature and their locations. When using Sudan as a case study in a longitudinal analysis, it is 
necessary to make some elaboration on the changes in power over time. This is important 
from an analytical point of view because the focus of this analysis aims to trace the changes 
that occurred according to the nature of power centers and according to their locations to 
grasp the dynamics of traditional leadership. For example, during the pre-colonialism period 
the centers of power and their locations were determined by factors related to the cultural 
beliefs of the community where the power centers were represented by spiritual leaders and 
the communities of the Sufis organization. Then, briefly before and during colonialism, the 
colonial regime itself, plus other social and economic factors, dictated changes on the nature 
of traditional leaders and their roles to incorporate more explicit and strong political 
missions. During the post-colonial era a shift is noticed in quality toward greater organization 
by the appearance of political parties and other organized entities. The beginning of the 
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configurations of urban versus rural appears, where traditional communities generally 
correspond with rural, whereas urban corresponds with the central authority and the centers 
of economic power. This shift occurs gradually during colonialism and blurs the power 
centers and boundaries between rural versus urban. These shifts were unobservable at the 
time, like any other historical process and, to great extent, they pertain to the use of current 
analytical tools rather than to actual geographic or palpable structural changes. Thus, the 
post-colonial analysis deals intensively with rural-urban discrepancies as a result of the 
historical process of shift of power quality and its concentration at the center of the political 
system. 
Moreover, I use the traditional leaders’ role and their integration in democratization 
to explain levels of public participation. The traditional leadership indicates the customary 
institutions or structures, or customary systems or procedures of influence, consultation, or 
rule, recognized, utilized or practiced by traditional communities. Accordingly, the 
traditional leader indicates any person who, in terms of customary law of the traditional 
community concerned, holds a traditional leadership position, and exerts authority on his/her 
community. Traditional leaders include tribal chiefs, spiritual leaders, healers, etc. Tribal 
chiefs are responsible for handling communal issues to solve disputes, manage economic 
activities, and make other public decisions that concern the people of their community. 
Spiritual leaders are persons who are believed to have spiritual power, and ability to predict 
events and heal sickness. They are usually consulted regarding issues such as marriage, 
sickness, collective seasonal movement, and war. 
Popular participation is the act of engagement in activities and organizations that 
benefit the local or national community. It also includes efforts to place demands on the 
central authority to elicit directional change. It includes organizations set up to achieve 
collective good for the community, such as local committees and civil society institutions 
that seek to influence the government or the central authority to provide public good for the 
local communities. The outcomes of these civil society institutions are specified in terms 
such as conflict resolution, participation in policy making, public service, resource 
management, and security. For example, traditional communities establish local committees 
that represent them socially and culturally to plan the seasonal distribution of land and water 
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resources. They also establish committees or institutions to solve disputes and problems that 
may lead to a wider conflict. Moreover, they build organized entities that channel local 
demands and concerns to governmental authorities at the regional or national level. These 
local organized bodies are also expected to contribute to policy making via consultation 
mechanisms. The organized bodies also have the responsibility of linking the local 
community with the national level through cultural programs and education. This strengthens 
the sense of national identity and common purpose of the country.  
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CHAPTER 4.  CHRONOLOGICAL STUDY 
This chapter traces the role of traditional leaders in Sudan from pre-colonialism to the 
present. I will explore traditional leaders’ sources of legitimacy, their achievements, and the 
social organization of their communities. I will also examine the attitude of the central 
authority and how it impacts the role of traditional leaders and their relationship with their 
communities. 
Historical Background 
According the archeological evidence, the history of Sudan began during the 
Paleolithic era. Three eras of civilizations, also known as the three groups of civilizations, 
emerged from an ancient pastoral culture that had flourished in Sudan since approximately 
7500 B.C., when the first human settlements were established. These three groups gave way 
to the Kerma civilization. The Kush kingdom emerged about 3500 B.C. Around 590 B.C., 
the capital of Kush was moved from Napata to Meroe, where inscriptions in Meroetic 
language became more common and elements of the Kush culture became more apparent. 
Archeological investigations attest to African or Sudanese traditions, such as religious beliefs 
and customs, a matrilineal succession of power, and the importance of the female position of 
Candace, or queen mother (Khalid, 1990). Throughout the reign of the Kush kingdom, there 
was institutional exchange and influence between Kush and Egyptian tradition, where each 
ruled the other for a period of time (Panafrican News Agency, 2004). The downfall of the 
Kush kingdom occurred about 330 A.D., when the Ethiopian Kingdom of Aksum emerged. 
The demise of the Kush civilization led to a decentralization of power in Sudan, which 
resulted in a number of kingdoms: Nubia, Maqarra, and Alwa.  
The most southern of the kingdoms that succeeded Kush civilization was Alwa, the 
Islamized kingdom, which survived the longest until it was replaced by the Funj sultanate in 
the 16th century. Alwa’s leader, Abdalla Jamma, defeated the Nubian and Maqarra Christian 
kingdoms in the north and established the first semi-centralized Muslim authority in northern 
Sudan. The penetration of Sudan by Islam occurred by Arab traders and immigrants. Unlike 
the introduction of Islam in North Africa, in Sudan, the conversion to Islam occurred 
gradually over a long time and as a complicated process. This gradual and complex process 
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was manifested as the result of compromise and mutual exchange between the local culture 
and Islam as well as the Arab culture. This resulted in a popular version of Islam that was 
woven into the fabric of indigenous tradition, which both affected and was affected by Islam. 
The penetration of Islam altered power relationships in subsequent years until it culminated 
in the establishment of the Funj and Fur sultanates in the 16th and 17th century, respectively, 
replacing Alwa in central Sudan. Trade with Egypt and Arabia was one of the major 
economic activities in Sudan. This provided Arab traders, and their language and religion, an 
opportunity to influence the people. At the same time, to enhance their trade relations, the 
Arab traders adopted local customs and traditions and intermarried with the local people. 
This mutual interaction led to the Arabization of the local people and indigenization of the 
Arabs, and resulted in maintaining the local traditions of governance of the Funj sultanate 
(Khalid, 1990).  
Pre-colonialism 
Funj Sultanate 
The Funj sultanate emerged in the 16th century as a powerful Islamized sultanate, 
replacing Alwa and expanding over the Nile valley, and to the present western border of 
Sudan with Chad. Islam remained the religion of elites who had access to trade and power. 
Then it spread broadly throughout the wide networks of religious scholars and leaders of the 
Sufi brotherhoods from North Africa, Iraq, and Arabia/Hejaz (Sidahmed, 2005). By the 
establishment of the first mosque in Sennar, the capital of the Funj sultanate along the Blue 
Nile, a majority of religious pundits started to emerge from the local people. This sowed the 
first traditional elitist segment  in central Sudan. The religious pundits were traders who 
received endowments from the rulers, which enabled them to accumulate a relatively great 
wealth. Their wealth, In addition to their ascetic life, which was motivated by the Sufi 
teachings, enabled the religious pundits to support their followers and maintain their 
allegiance. The religious leaders eventually became mediators between the rulers and the 
masses, which gave them tremendous political leverage over both the masses and the rulers 
(Khalid, 1990). The spread of religious schools and the rise of religious centers around 
prominent leaders and their decedents characterized this era in the Sudan. Some schools and 
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education centers specialized in law and philosophy whereas others specialized in religion, 
attracting students throughout Sudan (Warburg, 1979). However, there was no central 
educational or coordinating body among these schools.  
To relate this narrative in relation to my theory, the rule of the Funj was centralized 
only in name because religious and tribal centers maintained their autonomy and exerted 
leverage over the public and the rulers. The leaders of these centers acquired their influence 
and legitimacy from their spiritual position as religious scholars who had mystical powers, 
and also from their blood lines as descendants of holy men. They also maintained their power 
through their wealth which was used to provide economical support to their followers. 
Additionally, some traditional leaders were also healers through their spiritual power, as well 
as social councilors who solved problems and mediated disputes. These traits endowed those 
leaders with significant political and social influence over their communities. The religious 
and social organizations of these communities resembled a sort of traditional institutional 
design based on the socio-cultural features of the communities led by traditional leaders. Of 
particular importance is the significance of these leaders as mediators between the masses 
and the rulers which represented a type of integration in the governance system. Traditional 
leaders channeled the masses’ positions and interests while inducting the rulers’ power and 
influence to the masses. Moreover, at their local domains, they symbolized several socio-
political authorities. They represented the legislative where they offered fatwa and sanctioned 
rules. They also represented the judiciary who solved disputes, and represented the executive 
where they provided economic aid and social support. The importance of the leaders’ 
authority to this analysis is the fact that they did not only follow along a vertical path from 
the traditional leaders to their followers. Rather, there were also horizontal levels of influence 
where the leaders facilitated and encouraged the communal activities in terms of social and 
economic support of individuals and families to each other and their community. Although 
this type of support remains a distinctive characteristic of the Sudanese culture to date, 
traditional leaders apparently exerted a lot of influence to emphasize its importance. 
Evidence is apparent in the rich account of poetry and proverbs of wisdom spelled out by 
these leaders. Thus, traditional leaders emerged as the represented centers of power around 
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which several aspects of socio-political life of the community orbited. Traditional leaders 
represented a stabilizing force while stirring and facilitating communal activities. 
Fur Sultanate 
The Fur sultanate in the western parts of Sudan emerged during the 17th century from 
Daju and Tunjur kingdom which ruled the region from the 13th – 16th century. It expanded 
westward to the borders of present day Chad, and eastward to the White Nile at the expense 
of the Funj kingdom. The Fur state was an Islamic non-Arab Sudanese kingdom, which 
united and ruled the Fur and non-Fur peoples around the Marra Mountains and governed the 
present day provinces of Kordofan and Darfur (Sidahmed, 2005). As in the Funj sultanate, a 
compromise between the Arab/Islamic and local cultures enabled the success of the state 
while not suppressing local cultural characteristics. For example, the system of succession of 
power was matrilineal, wherein every ruler was followed by his nephew from his sister’s 
side. Although the system of law was theoretically based on Islamic law, customary law 
codified by Sultan Dalli was maintained in practice. The taxation system combined both 
Islamic and traditional customary systems. However, Islamic taxes were provided to the 
central state whereas traditional taxes were given to informal holders of localities. On the 
administrative level, the Fur provincial estates were formally endowed to the royal family 
members and to the tribal chiefs; nevertheless, informally, the administration of local justice 
was left to local chiefs and religious notables (Khalid, 1990). [don’t start “but” “so” “also”]  
It is important to note that active trade with Egypt and Hejaz was of significant 
importance wherein it was organized and protected by the central state. This motivated the 
rulers to apportion economic and political power between the governing elites appointed by 
them, as well as the local traditional religious and tribal elites. However, over time, the 
religious elites gained prominence over all (Khalid, 1990). The rulers of the Fur kingdom 
encouraged the immigration of merchants, religious men, and Sufi leaders from the northern 
and central parts of Sudan, and established educational and religious centers (Sidahmed, 
2005). Thus, although the general process of interaction between Islam and the Arab culture 
occurred similarly in the Funj and Fur kingdoms, there was more encouragement and 
coordination from the central state in the Fur kingdom. This provided the traditional elites in 
the Fur kingdom with a more powerful and acknowledged position in socio-political realms. 
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The powerful status of these elites and their legitimacy, which enhanced their influence, were 
products woven by a complex socio-cultural reality among educators, tribal chiefs, 
mediators, and religious scholarly and community preachers in addition to their economic 
capabilities.  
The traditional rural elites and leading families of the Sufis movement acquired a 
more significant political platform after the collapse of the central Fur state. This significant 
platform was indicative of, and facilitated by, a great level of autonomy and independence 
among the traditional elites and their communities maintained under the central state. The 
traditional elites developed into a formidable political oligarchy not only because of their 
religious and political power, but also because of their economic capabilities wherein they 
formed religious and community centers. Like the community centers in northern and central 
Sudan, the community centers in the Fur kingdom resembled institutions organized based on 
the socio-cultural traits of the region. They were led by traditional elites who conveyed 
spiritual, economic, and political powers. The legitimacy of the traditional elites was based 
on their positions as scholars and educators of the public, their mystical powers, and their 
economic capabilities. This offered the traditional elites a political and social leverage over 
their rulers as well as their local communities. Because of this leverage, they politically 
linked the central rulers with their masses through the application of justice, and the taxation 
and trade system. It is plausible to consider this as form of integration in the governance 
system of the central state. Moreover, like their counterparts in central and northern Sudan, 
the traditional elites preached and encouraged the public to support one another and work for 
their communities. They established centers for education, charities, and public service 
wherein the members of their communities received education, worked to support the needy, 
and served the center itself. Among others, the most effective medium of communication, to 
educate the people and encourage them to do good for their communities, was their poetry. 
The poetry contained educational elements and instructive components which was ascetic 
and enabled the wellbeing of the community. The achievements of these centers are seen in 
educational service, economic aid, social counseling and support, solving disputes, 
mobilizing the community, and leverage over the rulers regarding issues such as trade and 
taxation.  
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Therefore, one can infer that the traditional elites in both the Funj and Fur kingdoms 
enjoyed a significantly powerful position in the state governance system. Their legitimacy 
was driven by their spiritual, social and economic power. They served as a link between the 
rulers and the masses where they channeled public interest regarding issues such as trade and 
taxation. They also communicated the power and interests of the rulers to the public 
regarding events of taxation and war, when necessary. They also established centers where 
they educated people, offered economic aid, provided social counseling and support, solved 
disputes, and preached to the public as they carried out their work for their communities. It is 
important to note that the centers were organized based on socio-cultural elements of the 
region, and joining them was voluntary without any coercive urging. It was well known that 
individuals chose a brotherhood or center they liked according to its teachings, instruction, 
and general ideology. It was also well known that the ethnic and historical background of 
individuals contributed to these decisions, but joining and leaving a brotherhood or a center 
was a free, voluntarily choice. This indicates the flexibility and liberty ascribed to these 
communities which were ingrained in their socio-cultural system. The centers also provided a 
platform where the people volunteered to serve. The traditional elites used poetry and 
proverbs as the most effective tools to communicate their messages to the public. This socio-
cultural organization manifested a sort of integration of traditional elites in the governance 
system under a central state where the public and center state formed a link while playing a 
powerful role towards the wellbeing of local communities. Thus, it can be surmized that 
traditional leaders contributed significantly to the stability of the state while maintaining the 
socio-cultural and socio-economic stability of society. In light of my theory, the role of the 
traditional leaders was effective in this manner because it was legitimated by the socio-
cultural values of the community. Traditional leadership was an extension of the socio-
cultural system, both playing a role to maintain it and supported by it.  
Southern Sudan 
The southern part of Sudan witnessed a different development than the north did. Its 
geographic nature contributed to its relative isolation, whereby the mountains and rivers 
formed barriers to the outside world. This resulted in maintaining a separate social and 
cultural identity where much of the region toward northern Uganda was inhabited by 
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speakers of the central Sudanic language during the first millennium A.D. Then Neolithic 
groups who were located in the southern parts expanded in the region. The focus of this 
research is on four of these groups because they represent large proportions of the southern 
Sudanese people who also represent two different, major socio-political structures—
centralized political authority, represented by the Shulluk and Azandi, and non-centralized 
political authority represented by the Dinka and Nuer. The major group among these is the 
Dinka, which constitutes the single largest tribe in the south who settled in an area that 
corresponds to present day Bahr-Alghazal and the Upper Nile. The Dinka and Nuer tribes did 
not form centralized political institutions; rather, they were comprised of a cluster of 
groupings with common cultural characteristics (Sidahmed, 2005).  
The Nuer and Dinka tribes had a similar socio-political organization. Their 
organizational structure was influenced by their environment and economic activities 
whereby they functioned in an intricate economy comprised of farming, pastoralism, fishing, 
and trade. Their cattle herds had a higher socio-cultural value than a mere economic resource. 
Their intricate economy required seasonal movement, living in scattered clusters, and 
occasionally leaving and joining different groups. The seasonal fluctuation of resources 
contracted their social ties wherein they shared their food, resources, and protected one 
another. There was no common political authority or central organization, and their 
organization was based on a lineage and an age system. The lineage system was comprised of 
clans, tribes and divisions where a certain clan could be located in any cluster or group 
within the nation as well as for the age set (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1970). Their legal 
system and socio-political rules were upheld and applied by the elders without a permanent 
centralized individual authority. They combined for defense and offense whereby men of 
different ages and different groups comprised a unified front. “The Nuer and the Dinka 
[italics are mine] nations are highly individualistic and libertarian. It is acephalous state 
lacking legislative, judicial, and executive organs. Nevertheless, it is far from chaotic. It has a 
persistent and coherent form which might be called ‘ordered anarchy’ ” (Evans-Pritchard and 
Fortes, 1970:296). The absence of centralized government ... “is less remarkable than the 
absence of any persons who represent the unity and the exclusiveness of these groups” 
(Evans-Pritchard and Fortes, 1970:296). 
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The  example of central organization appeared in the Shilluk and Azandi nations. On 
on hand, the Shilluk nation constituted a common territory, common language, and a central 
authority. The Shilluk people paid allegiance to an authority within an elaborate system of 
customs and traditions which informed the attitudes of the people, the exercise of power, and 
all other social relations. Their economic activities were comprised of activities of 
subsistence agriculture, breeding domestic animals, fishing, and some crop agriculture. The 
Shilluk kingdom was comprised of two principal political divisions [states]: the north and the 
south which were divided into 15 provinces, each under the administration of a paramount 
chief directly responsible to the Räth, who was believed to be the incarnation of Nyikango 
and a sovereign combination of political, administrative, judicial and spiritual power. The 
chiefs of the  south and north were the most senior positions and considered as front guards. 
The paramount chief had under his authority, village or clan chiefs. There were also chiefs 
with special functions, e.g. chiefs of the hippo were situated in the south, and the chief of 
Nile was in the north. In each province, a military commander emerged by virtue of his 
military prowess and valor, but he had no administrative functions or authority. [use nouns] 
On the hand, the Azandi tribe which settled in the western part of the south was 
comprised of other earlier groups, and led by a central political authority: the Azandi 
kingdom. The Azandi socio-political system was an intricate admixture of feudalism, 
traditional, political, and administrative authority as well as witchcraft, charms, etc. The 
Azandi chiefs were basically from the royal clan, and combined judicial and spiritual 
prowess.  
For this analysis and application of this researcher’s theory, it was deduced that the 
southern Sudanese nations differed in the fact that two tribes, the Dinka and the Nuer, did not 
constitute a central authority whereas two others, the Azandi and the Shilluk, did. 
Nevertheless, they had general features in common despite a difference in authority rule,. 
First, they were dedicated to the wellbeing of their community while maintaining individual 
liberties. Second, they had a type of leadership represented by the distinguished chiefs of the 
Shilluk and Azandi, and the elders of the Dinka and Nuer. Third, their leadership was a 
variation of different traditional platforms: political, legal, administrative, and spiritual. 
Fourth, traditional leadership was established upon and maintained the socio-cultural system 
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which was influenced by the environment and its resources. Sixth, they communicated their 
values and passed their heritages through rich accounts comprised of fables, crafts, songs, 
and dance which were used in rituals and social ceremonies. These elements were the pillars 
for achieving socio-environmental equilibrium, harmonizing the group, and maintaining 
identity. Thus, the socio-cultural system in these communities influenced by environmental 
features produced a form of traditional leadership which supported and was maintained by it. 
Thus, traditional leadership was the stabilizing element of each tribe’s livelihood 
legitimatized by cultural beliefs, which placed it at the center of power of the community. 
The central authority in the case of the Azandi and the Shilluk is both permissive and 
constructive toward the chiefs since they all belonged to the same socio-cultural system. 
Nuba Mountains 
The Nuba Mountains are located in the northern part of the southern Sudanese states. 
The Nuba were organized according to the principle of dual lineal descent where every 
member belonged to both a partri-clan and a matri-clan. This organizational principle was 
reflected in all social and economic aspects. The economy of the community was a 
complicated system that was interlocked in the social and political functions which interacted 
based on specific environmental traits. Nuba society was called a classless society because it 
did not recognize a paramount leader. Age was used to determine the main authority and 
prestige of individuals in the community. The elder’s authority was without exerted power 
upon others to compel them. In other words, the elders did not govern society; rather, they 
administered their role as specialists of ritual affairs. When a decision needed to be made all 
the individuals present held a session and tried to reach consensus on the matter. Because it 
was hard to manage such a session comprised of a large number of individuals, the most 
expert individuals on the matter organized such a session only when necessary. The Nuba 
community constituted several elders’ councils, in which each member had a specific 
specialization, such as peace specialist, honey specialist, rain specialist, grains specialist, and 
elephant specialist. Each member had a number of assistants.. The specializations were given 
to them according to their matri-clan or patri-clan membership. Moreover, the councils had 
rules of conduct, and members who violated the rules were punished by the community. The 
councils also received respect from the community through the way in which the community 
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members communicated with them and deferred to their decisions. It is noteworthy that the 
respect conveyed to the specialist originated from the belief that specialists belong to a divine 
source. The term specialist is represented by the word “sun”, or the source of life, and used 
when communicating with the members of the council. 
To comprehend the Nuba society in light of the theory guiding this research, the Nuba 
society had a social organization that was based on a dual-lineal system. The Nuba 
community constituted councils of experts who managed political, economic, and cultural 
issues. These councils were comprised of individuals according to their age and expertise. 
The Nuba community sanctioned reciprocal rules of conduct deferred to the councils and to 
monitor their own conduct. Thus, the Nuba formed a type of institution based on the socio-
cultural traits of their community which was shaped and influenced by environmental 
features. They managed their economic activities through social organizations/institutions 
which were comprised of individuals who drew their legitimacy from socio-cultural values 
represented by age, expertise, and the belief in a divine source of life. Through these socio-
cultural institutions the Nuba managed their economy, settled disputes, achieved harmony, 
and maintained equilibrium within their socio-environmental system. The role of traditional 
elites was a positive constructive role that was organized within their institutions, in which 
traditional elites were given acknowledged positions and tasks.  
When examining the various traditional communities of Sudan prior to colonialism, 
one must realize that the socio-cultural system, situated in the environmental features, was 
the basis of the socio-political organization of the communities. The legitimacy of this 
organization along with its leadership was driven by the socio-cultural values and norms of 
the community which maintained it and was maintained by it. The critical element that made 
traditional leadership effective in stabilizing the community and, in the cases of religious and 
education centers, promoted the people for the collective good of the community. 
Additionally, in the case of power centers in the Funj and Fur kingdoms, a permissive central 
state enabled a more influential role of traditional leaders within their communities. 
Traditional leadership was a formidable element of the society indicating a socio-culturally 
driven legitimacy. Thus, the study of pre-colonism revealed that traditional leaders were 
powerful sources of socio-political influence.  
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Colonialism 
Turco-Egyptian Rule 
Until the Truco-Egyptian conquest of Sudan in 1821, there was no truly orthodox 
Islamic authority with universal recognition in Sudan. The fact that the process of 
Islamization occurred gradually over several centuries, and was conducted by the Sudanese 
themselves, gave Sudanese Islam its distinctive characteristics and profoundly impacted the 
role of Islam in the life and politics of modern Sudan (Khalid, 1990:30). By the time of the 
invasion of the Ottoman Empire, the central authority of the Funj kingdom was encountering 
divisions that weakened it which resulted in surrender without resistance. The conquest of 
Sudan by the Ottoman Empire resulted in important repercussions for Sudan. The 
repercussion of concern to this research was the altering of power relations of the local 
religious and traditional elites to the central authority. Justification for the conquest was to 
bring Sudan to the lawful ruler of the Muslim world: the Ottoman emperor.  
Consequently, three learned men from Al-Azhar accompanied the first expedition to 
form an orthodox Islamic state in Sudan. Indeed, there was huge gap between the orthodox 
official religion of the new conquerors and the faith of the Sudanese people. This call for 
orthodox Islam threatened to undermine the influence of the established traditional leaders of 
the Sufi brotherhoods and their centers in the communities. The Turks lifted the taxation 
exemptions and eliminated the economic relation of the traditional elites with the central 
authorities that was maintained by the Funj and Fur kingdoms (Khalid, 1990). The central 
state of Turk rule attempted to subvert the traditional elites to adopt their perspective through 
a centrally organized school system that replaced the educational centers of the traditional 
elites. The Turks also treid to establish Shari’ courts but their attempts failed. When the 
Turks realized that they could not rule the country without the involvement of the traditional 
elites they appointed chiefs to some local communities without executive responsibilities. In 
addition to the chiefs, the Turks also appointed officers to collect taxes. The traditional 
leaders who co-opted with the Ottoman rule gained economically and politically, and were 
used in wars against reluctant leaders (Warburg, 1979). 
 Turkish rule against the traditional elites not only excluded traditional elites from the 
governance system, but also created conflict between the central authorities and those elites. 
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Further, these moves triggered competition and conflict between the traditional elites 
themselves. Another significant change that occurred due to these moves was that 
membership to a larger order or brotherhood became more than swearing allegiance, and did 
not involve spiritual initiation. This was because, for the elites, membership became more 
than a matter of devotion; rather, it ensured them a political platform. The exclusion of 
traditional elites from central Ottoman rule in Sudan not only created hostility between the 
central authority and the traditional elites, but also transmitted this hostility to the public, and 
diminished their popular participation and identification with the state. This was manifested 
in popular resistance and reluctance to pay taxes, and incited rebellion against the state in 
1822 (Khalid, 1990). 
To relate this narrative to the theoretical framework of this research, it can be inferred 
that a change transpired in the relationship between the traditional elites and their 
communities, and the resulting competition between them is very insightful from the point of 
this analysis. This is because it pinpoints one of the parameters that helped to maintain the 
positive functions of the traditional elites and the cohesion of traditional communities. In 
particular, this parameter involved a universal system of governance that assures the 
positions and roles of traditional leaders to play a positive role in their community and, 
thereby, the state. When the assurance and recognition became endangered, it triggered a 
fundamental change in how the leaders perceived their roles towards their communities. 
Their focus shifted to a defensive strategy of recruitment of members and polarization of the 
population. This leads this researcher to posit that integrating traditional elites in a universal 
system of governance, and recognizing their positive role and position obviates the 
divisiveness of society and prevents hostile interaction between communal groups. Thus, the 
integration of traditional leaders would facilitate their positive contribution to their local 
communities and contribute to the stability of the state. Any attempt to guarantee people’s 
loyalty by imposing appointed traditional leaders is doomed to a failure. Further, it valides 
this researcher’s proposition that the attitude of the central authority toward the traditional 
leadership is a critical determinant of their roles in their communities and in the state. When 
the central authority’s attitude was negative toward the traditional leadership, it triggered 
hostility and a potentially exploitive relationship with their followers. 
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Central to this argument is that the source of the threat presented by the Ottoman rule 
to those elites and their communities was of multiple aspects that highlight the components 
of the traditional structure and leadership. It also supports this researcher’s premises that 
traditional communities need to be dealt with as complex whole of interconnected parts. 
First, the attempts of the central state to promote orthodox Islam threatened the belief system 
of the elites and their communities, which represented a way of denying the existing 
worldview and attempting to impose a foreign one. Second, imposing a foreign system of 
taxation instead of the traditional one, as well as removing economic privileges of the elites’ 
undermined their organizations and socio-economic support they provided to their followers. 
This was demonstrated by the outcome of imposing a foreign system of taxes that 
destabilized the existing socio-economic system. Third, deeming the traditional elites’ 
spiritual and religious practices as unrighteous endangered their appeal and social prestige. 
That was threat to the legitimacy of the leadership and denigration for their belief system. 
Fourth, excluding the traditional elites from the central governance system eliminated their 
political leverage as mediators between the central authority and their local communities. 
Fifth, attempts to manipulate local communities’ loyalty by appointing traditional chiefs 
desecrated the ground upon which this loyalty was built and resulted in conflict and failure.  
Therefore, one can argue that, to assess and analyze the traditional communities and 
the role of the traditional elites, one should tackle them as a whole of inseparable parts. It is 
important to recognize and acknowledge the multiple aspects that contribute to the 
cohesiveness of communities and the role played by their leaders. Analyzing these 
communities primarily from a “power relations” point of view results in an incomplete and 
impaired analysis. This is apparent regarding the concentrated focus of analysis on 
constitutional and government-level arrangements regarding making assessments and 
recommendations of fledgling democracies. By the same token, evaluation based soley on an 
economic approach leads to misleading conclusions as it reveals total growth of the state and 
national income without consideration of traditional livelihoods and local socio-economic 
systems. This is apparent in theories that make decisive linkages between democracy and 
open global economies. Therefore, the elements of the analysis must consider the intricate 
web of social, economic, political, cultural, environmental, and spiritual factors that interact 
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to produce the phenomenon of traditional elites in their communities. Next, traditional elites 
need to be situated in a universal context of the governance system of the state and assessed 
based on their interactive relationship and the central authority.  
Mahdiyya 1881-1898 
Mohammad Ahmad Al-Mahdi is known as the father of nationalism in Sudan because 
he unified the country for the first time. His spiritual appeal, organizational skills, and 
charisma enabled him to bring the population under one ideation. He managed to overcome 
tribal and religious groupings by instituting the Mahdist movement. During the 
overwhelmingly unpopular Turkish rule, the people considered the religious elites as their 
central political voice. Therefore, the Mahdist movement was considered a further politico-
religious development (Khalid, 1990). Al-Mahdi understood the centers of power of 
Sudanese society during the time, which were based on tribal and spiritual elements. After 
gaining support of the northern and central communities, al-Mahdi succeeded in Kordofan 
and Dar Fur in the west, the Nuba Mountains in the southern west, and the Beja tribes in the 
east. The success of al-Mahdi was attributed to the fact that he understood that he could not 
influence the people of Sudan without the support of traditional elites as represented in Sufis 
movement and the tribal chiefs,. Therefore, Al-Mahdi sent the traditional elites letters 
inviting them explicitly to join his movement. This indicates that Al-Mahdi did not attempt, 
at that stage, to impose a singular focus of authority. He was, rather, willing to accept the 
traditional elites as centers of power (Warburg, 1979).  
The defeat al-Mahdi committed on the Turkish rule in several battles gave him more 
attractiveness and appeal among the Sudanese population. The traditional elites who were 
favored by the Turkish rule were reluctant to join the uprising of the Mahdiyya movement, 
and some of them fled to Egypt. Furthermore, AlMahdi organized the army for the 
movement according to cultural divisions of the Sudanese society; although each grouping 
had a leader with a banner, all worked under the Mahdiyya revolution banner. The Mahdiyya 
army defeated General Gordon and captured the capital of Khartoum, putting an end to 
Turkish rule in Sudan. The Mahdist movement’s defeat of the Turks culminated in the 
establishment of the Mahdist State under A-Mahdi rule with its capital in Omdurman. After 
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the death of A-Mahdi, Caliph Abd Allah ruled until he was killed in the battle against the 
British conquers (Khalid, 1990).  
It is important in this analysis to note that A-Mahdi called for an Islamic faith that 
follows the Sunna: the same call of the Turkish rulers. The entire country was brought under 
one central rule, with “Ameers” (Princes) representing every part of Sudan. Thus, A-Mahdi 
succeeded where the Turks had failed. The strongest indication of success was that the higher 
judicial power was in the hands of the ruler, Abdu Allah, who became Al-Mahdi’s successor. 
Thus, one can assert that the fact that Al-Mahdi succeeded in convincing the population, 
building a national movement, and bringing the people under one central state can be 
attributed to his recognition of the existing traditional elites as centers of power. Al-Mahdi 
did not deem the traditional elites as unrighteous and exclude them from his movement as the 
Turks had done. Al-Mahdi did not try to undermine the traditional elites’ authorities, at least 
during the first stages of the movement. Rather, he acknowledged their positions and roles, 
sent them letters inviting them to join the national movement, and gave them tasks to serve in 
the movement. Al-Mahdi’s approach to the traditional leaders resulted in the massive and 
unprecedented success of his movement which dethroned the Turkish rule and built the 
Mahdyyia state. This attests that integrating the traditional elites in a national system, in this 
case the movement, promotes their positive roles and increases popular participation. It is 
also important to acknowledge that the great influence Al-Mahdi had on the Sudanese people 
was attributed to his spiritual appeal, political astuteness, and organizational skills. This 
attests that the type of legitimacy is critical to appeal to traditional communities where the 
people can acknowledge and identify with it.    
Anglo-Egyptian Rule 
After defeating the Mahdiyya army and killing Abdu Allah in Um Debekrat, the 
British put an end to the Mahdiyya state and established their own government in Sudan, and 
moved the capital back to Khartoum. Their major focus from that time until World War I was 
on repressing the various forms of resistance they encountered. During that period many 
traditional leaders were executed and numerous uprisings were decimated. The British 
considered the poor performance of the Egyptians during Turkish rule as the cause of the 
Mahdiyya revolt. Therefore, the administration offices were filled by British officers. To 
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further limit the role of the Egyptians, they needed the support of the Sudanese (Khalid, 
1990). Hence, they tried to foster indigenous leadership which would gradually assume lower 
positions in administration. However, because most of the indigenous leaders were 
supporters of the Mahdiyya revolt, the British viewed them with suspicion and tried to 
nurture new leaders. They established a board to advise the government on religious issues 
but it did not have influence on the government’s policies or on the people. The British also 
established local tribal leaders who worked as inspectors for the British government whom 
local communities despised and, therefore, did not influence the people (Warburg, 1979).  
Central to this discussion is the evolution of two leaders, Sayyid Ali and Sayyid Abdu 
Alrahman, because of their leadership type—traditional leadership—and because of their 
substantial influence on Sudanese politics. Sayyid Ali, who was an ally of the Turkish rule, 
fled to Egypt during the Mahdiyya revolt but returned after the British established rule. 
During his stay in Egypt Sayyid Ali strengthened his relationship with Sir Reginald Wingate 
who later became the governor of Sudan, as well as other high ranking British officials. 
When he returned, Sayyid Ali was treated as the utmost religious leader because the British 
realized that they needed popular support of the Sudanese. Because Sayyid Ali was a strong 
opponent of Egyptian involvement in Sudan, he resonated with the segments of Sudanese 
who had experienced Turco-Egyptian rule or were still espousing the anti-Turkish (Egyptian) 
ideology of the Mahdist state (Khalid, 1990).   
The other traditional leader, Sayyid Abdu Alrahman, Al Mahdi’s son, was young 
when two of his brothers were killed, and the rest of his family was arrested by the British 
and exiled. Later, he visited Aba Island the cradle of Mahdiyya movement, and decided to 
revive his ties with his father’s supporters. He intended to make Aba Island the spiritual, 
social, and economic center of his movement. However, Abdu Alrahman and his family were 
treated with suspicion by the British, and their movement was restricted until they were given 
permission to return to Omdurman, although under constant British surveillance. Later, he 
was allowed to cultivate his family’s estates, henceforth, the Mahdists’ movement was reborn 
again as a religious-political movement (Warburg, 2003). A large influx of followers and 
supporters moved to the Mahdist center, some of whom worked in the fertile lands. Besides 
the financial benefits reaped from land cultivation, the revived movement was financed by 
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what was called “sadaqa”, or a voluntary tax given to a social or chartable cause (Warburg, 
1979).  
The outbreak of World War I necessitated mobilizing support against the Turkish 
pan-Islamic propaganda. A critical part of that process was eliminating Egypt’s influence in 
Sudan because of her anticipated independence. To achieve that, the British resorted to the 
Mahdists because of their vehement anti-Egyptian sentiment. Therefore, Abdu Alrahman was 
permitted to emerge and mobilize his followers freely. He took advantage of that and, to 
consolidate his religious and political power with economic strength; he expanded his 
agricultural schemes during the war.  With the mounting Egyptian nationalist influence in 
Sudan, the British recruited all Sudanese traditional leaders to condemn Egyptian 
involvement and confirm loyalty to the British. The Governor-General decided to send a 
delegation of Sudanese traditional leaders to London to express that sentiment. The 
delegation included Sayyid Ali and Sayyid Abdu Alrahman, leaders of other Sufis, and chiefs 
of tribal communities. Sayyid Abdu Alrahman expressed that the cooperation with the British 
rule was dedicated by the political reality of eradicating Egyptian influence and interest and, 
consequently, assuming full independence from the British (Warburg, 1979:26). And by 
meeting with the British king in London, Sayyid Abdu Alrahman exalted his position and his 
popular movement, from being considered by the British as fanatic movement, to a national 
representative of Sudanese people. This enabled him to openly preach and address the public 
without fearing repercussions from the British authorities (Warburg, 1979). Moreover, 
Sayyid Abdu Alrahman formed an alliance with certain sections of young Sudanese 
intelligentsia and helped them to found the graduates’ club and also helped establishing the 
first Sudanese newspaper. The editor of that paper, with Sayyid Abdu Alrahman’s support, 
became the first outspoken agent of “The Sudan for the Sudanese” movement of the younger 
generations.  
After the removal of Egyptian elements from the British rule in Sudan, Sayyid Abdu 
Alrahman emerged with well-organized movement, enjoyed the adherence of leading 
members of the young intelligentsia, possessed financial means for further ambitions, and 
had substantial political influence. Despite the existence of other local traditional groupings, 
Sayyid Abdu Alrahman’s and Sayyid Ali’s groupings emerged as the only widely popular 
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movements. The British tried to foster direct “native administration” with the tribal 
population using appointed tribal chiefs. This attempt aimed at limiting the influence of the 
two Sayyids because their help was no longer needed after the war and after removing the 
Egyptians. But the impact of that attempt was heavier on Sayyid Abdu Alrahman the British 
feared the rise of the Mahdists and viewed him and his followers with suspicion.  With the 
growing numbers of Sayyid Abdu Alrahman’s followers who gathered in his center on 
certain times of the year and following a mass demonstration on Aba Island, the center of the 
movement, the British ordered them to stop their activities and to disband their organizations. 
That order was followed by eliminating those followers from the Sudan Defense Forces.  
Then, a new policy, launched by Sir John Maffey, was to economically bind Sayyid Abdu 
Alrahman with the government believing that allowing his followers to cultivate their land 
would keep them busy from engaging in political activities. The result of that policy was the 
opposite of its purpose. The Sayyid and his followers expanded their agricultural schemes 
and thereby strengthened their economic status. The followers were seeking spiritual 
guidance; the Sayyid was promoting the Mahdist political mission, and supplied their 
material needs (Warburg, 1979). 
It is important for our analysis to note in this narrative that the Mahdist movement 
included three segments of the Sudanese population. The first was the tribal supporters who 
believed in his spiritual and religious power and who were following their Sufism sentiment. 
The second segment was the sophisticated tribal chiefs and population. And within this 
segment the policy of the “native administration” was intended to hit him the hardest, but he 
was shrewd enough to attract them to his side instead of hindering them. For instance, he 
supported them in their disputes with the authorities over taxation and treated them with 
generosity. Then, later after he guaranteed their side, he managed to mobilize them for the 
“The Sudan for Sudanese” movement; the same posture he fostered with the Sufis. 
Additionally, he realized that without the involvement of other local traditional groups he 
could not fight his political battles. Therefore, he played significant role in solving leadership 
disputes, mediated land disputes, gave financial aid to their activities, and send agents to win 
their loyalties.  The third segment was the inhabitants of the towns and among them the 
educated Sudanese and government officials whom he won their confidence at the political, 
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rather than the religious, level. Therefore, he adopted the graduates’ political activities and 
engaged in their political debates. What encouraged his engagement more was the fact that 
the British intended to hinder the development of the intelligentsia and promote the “native 
administration” by promoting only technical education a fact gave him common ground with 
the young educated people. For example, he strengthened his relation with the Omdurman’s 
Graduates’ Club and adopted their meetings and debates. The outcomes of this movement, 
for example, were the protests and demonstrations of students and young Sudanese officials 
and the college students strike in 1931.  
In addition, the Mahdists established a printing house and founded Sudanese 
newspapers, thereby; they were able to publish the intelligentsia’s political thought. 
Furthermore, many factors made the British open to establishing a new intelligentsia 
organization: the Graduates’ Congress in 1938.  The factor that concerns us here is that the 
British realized that the “native administration” and the tribal organization had fundamentally 
influenced by the Mahdist movement and therefore fostering an antidote for the popular 
movements was sought within the educated class. As a result of participation in many 
political events and debates, the Graduates’ Congress appeared in the Sudanese political 
scene. Although the Congress was intended to eliminate the sectarian politics of the two 
Sayyids, its survival without their involvement was impossible. That is because the only 
national publishing house and the news papers were owned by Sayyid Abdu Alrahman and 
other news papers was owned by Sayyid Ali. Additionally, Congress demanded to broadcast 
in the radio and their request was refused by the authorities, instead, they were invited 
individually to broadcast therefore they collectively boycotted the government’s broadcasts 
on Sudanese culture unless they were allowed in the Congress’s name. This incident made 
Congress turn into a political assembly and called for forming a national front composed of 
the followers of the two Sayyids, the tribal leaders, and the urban notables using Sayyid 
Abdu Alrahman news paper for its publications. The objective was to bring all of them into 
an open relation with the Congress and earn their political support. By this, the elections of 
the congress resulted in the domination of Sayyid Abdu Alrahman’s followers. Subsequently, 
there was obvious success of the Congress’s activities. For example, they organized 
education days in which they raised fund for non-governmental schools and they succeeded, 
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for that matter, massively among all Sudanese sectors. Another significant achievement was 
that the government allowed them to broadcast on cultural affairs. This proved that the 
Congress with the support of the Sayyid could do better social work. 
By the mid 1940s and following many divisions, the Graduates’ Congress ceased to 
play significant political role and gave way to the two major political parties in which the 
traditional leaders, along with the two Sayyids, were influential. Also, an advisory council 
was founded by the government to foster local administration in which the traditional leaders 
were predominant. This led to a shift in the political weight from the capital to the rural 
areas.   
Moreover, in 1946 when the British were negotiating with the Egyptians the future of 
Sudan and one of the proposals is to be under Egypt’s sovereignty, Sayyid Abdu Alrahman 
and his followers set up the “Independence Front” and organized massive demonstrations 
against the proposal in all Sudanese towns (Warburg, 1979). Additionally, an uprising 
against the British government occurred in Tuti Island led to an expansion in political 
influence of Sayyid Ali among the Sufis order. To bring the Sudanese people under one front 
to work for the independence, Sayyid Abdu Alrahman invited the graduates’ leaders, the 
members of the advisory council, and the traditional leaders for a meeting. They agreed to 
discuss the proposal of working together under one entity for Sudan’s independence without 
being identified with any of the Sayyids. They agreed on establishing a new independent 
newspaper. This paved the way for establishing the Umma Political Party. To break the party 
apart the British exerted a lot of effort. They founded what they called “the Socialist 
Republican Party” and proposed to the tribal chiefs and village notables to leave the Umma 
party and represent the rural population themselves. This attempt failed and those who joined 
the new party returned to the Umma party because of their socio-cultural and historical ties 
with its leaders and followers. That was followed by forming the Legislative Assembly in 
1948 at the Sudan Administration Conference. One of the proposals in that assembly was that 
the tribal chiefs should stand for elections as representative of the rural population. Although 
this point was opposed by some leaders, Sayyid Abdu Alrahman promoted it and stressed 
that it was a framework in which all the political parties and religious circles of Sudan 
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conferred together, thus, the British cannot instigate divisions between religious leaders and 
tribal chiefs or between traditional leaders and the educated class (Khalid, 1990).   
Additionally, when the issue of Sudan’s status in regards to Egypt came into play and 
an agreement was signed between Egypt and Britain there was ferocious opposition among 
Sudanese people for any kind of affiliation with Egypt despite Egyptian efforts to do 
otherwise. During the negotiations Sayyid Ali published a manifesto in which he proposed 
that all Sudanese parties should support a referendum to determine the future of the country 
together. This proposal was discussed in the Sudanese parliament and was carried by a 
decisive majority. Sayyid Abdu Alrahman added that the future of Sudan was already agreed 
upon: independence. The referendum, therefore, should be about the form of government 
after independence. Sayyid Abdu Alrahman and his followers were strongly opposing any 
definition strengthened the Egyptian king upon Sudan. Sayyid Abdu Alrahman repeatedly 
stated that this would be an end of Sudanese nationalism, independence, and sovereignty. 
Then, after organizing massive demonstrations in all Sudanese towns, he sent a telegram to 
Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister of Britain, and to Sidqi Pasha, the Prime Minister of 
Egypt, asking them to meet with them. Attlee remarked that a deal was sealed with Egypt 
asking the Sayyid and the delegation where they had been all the time. The Sayyid responded 
articulately that Britain had eliminated the Sudanese from any negotiations that concerned 
their future since 1899 and they would not take the blame or accept to exchange a foreign 
rule with another one and they were willing to fight for independence if necessary. It was 
claimed that Sayyid Abdu Alrahman won the talk with Attlee and the negotiation shelved the 
agreement between Egypt and Britain to give the right to Egypt to rule Sudan. In 1952 
Sayyid visited London again and negotiated with Anthony Eden, the British Foreign 
Secretary, who advised him to talk to Egyptians. Then in 1953 an agreement was ratified 
between Sudanese Umma party and the Egyptian government granting Sudan the right of 
self-determination and government formation within three years. This included the departure 
of all Egyptian and British military forces (Warburg, 1979).  
The general elections to the Sudanese parliament took place in 1953.The opening 
ceremony of Sudanese parliament was held on March 1954 and witnessed massive 
demonstration of Umma party and Mahdists against the proposed Egyptian rule on Sudan. In 
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1955 the Sudanese parliament asked Egypt and Britain to recognize Sudan’s independence 
and formed a committee of five a request Egypt refused claiming that since Britain was still 
there they would not recognize Sudan’s independence. That request was publicly supported 
by organizations such as Students’ Union, Federation of Trade Unions, and Jazira Cotton 
Growers’ Association. With all this pressure the British General resigned from Sudan, the 
committee of five took over all his power before Britain assigns a new Governor-General. In 
January 1956, Sudan was declared an independent state. 
On the other hand, south Sudan received different treatment from the colonial rule 
and the unfolding of political events in both the south and the Nuba Mountain took different 
manifestation. For the people of the south and the Nuba Mountain maintained vicious 
resistance to any attempt to impose a foreign culture on them. For example, Evans Pritchard 
testified that the Nuer people of the south considered the British “cattleless beggars” and 
openly disrespected them (Evans-Pritchard, as cited in Khalid, 1990). On the other hand, the 
British conveyed extremely racist attitude and considered their relation with the southerners 
as a “civilizing mission” to teach them “elements of common sense, good behavior, and 
obedience to a central authority” as indicated by Lord Cromer (Khalid, 1990:47). On the 
administration level, the British adopted what was called “Southern Policy” which separated 
the south from the rest of the country economically and culturally. The south was subjected 
to influx of Christian missionaries, imposing English as language of communication, 
communication with the rest of the country was prevented, northern names and traditional 
dress were prohibited, Arabic was prohibited, the traders were stopped from moving to and 
from the south, the movement was restricted by the Passports and Permits Ordinance, and 
private and public development projects were hindered claiming the unpreparedness of the 
region to them. This all resulted in a south as a “close zone”. Also, the British adopted the 
indirect rule where they appointed chiefs and dismissed them according to their loyalty to 
their regime. They also established courts to use their codes instead of the indigenous rules of 
judgment. Additionally, they raided cattle to collect taxes and forced people to work without 
payment. They also monopolized ivory trade which had been an important source of income 
for the native people (Lesch, 1998).  
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Therefore, it took long time before the people in these areas formed any form of solid 
relation with colonial regime. And there was steady resistance from the time of the conquest 
at least up to 1930. That was because leaders led local and uncoordinated efforts to resist the 
foreign rule. For instance, in 1905 the Dinka led by a member of their community attacked 
and killed the British officer in Rumbek, in 1905 the Azandi community demonstrated an 
uprising, and from 1907 to 1921 the Dinka consistently disturbed the British in the area. 
Also, in 1919, the Dinka rebelled and killed the Governor of Mangala. Also, led by the 
spiritual leader, the Nuer rebellion was brought to an end only in 1930. Therefore, it has been 
noticed that the British used brutal force in the region in order to forge a policy of control 
(Khalid, 1990). Moreover, when the advisory council was formed in 1944 by the British, all 
its members were from the north where the unity of the country was insisted on without any 
consultation from the south. Also, after a mounting criticism, the British agreed to hold a 
conference in Juba, a southern town, where the British selected all the southern 
representatives who were in their payroll, appointed chiefs, or junior police officials. Some of 
those chiefs demanded improved quality of education and development and gradual 
resumption in south-north activities. Consequently, on the following year the travel and trade 
restrictions were cancelled (Lesch, 1998). In 1955, when the issue of Sudan’s future was 
raised, the Egyptians and the British used a propaganda claiming that the northerners were 
seeking their own interest and were not considering the south. That propaganda was aired in 
the radio in many southern Sudanese dialects. This resulted in massive demonstrations in 
1955 in the south demanding their own future. These events sawed the seeds of the civil war 
between the north and the south (Warburg, 1979). 
From this historical narrative and applying my theory, we can infer that the traditional 
leaders played a substantial role on mobilizing the Sudanese population on several arenas. 
Their legitimacy was driven from their spiritual appeal and political leverage, and was 
facilitated by their economic strength. One of the interesting points was the fact that the 
traditional leaders had this appeal among different segments of Sudanese population despite 
their level of education, location (urban or rural), ethnicity, economic status, and age. This 
signifies that there were characteristics that fared in a deeper socio-cultural ground through 
which Sudanese people were able to communicate, cooperate and deliberate on issues that 
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concern them as a nation. They were able to organize themselves and put demands and 
pressure on the central authority. They were also able to influence the course of the events to 
attain relative gains through negotiations and uprisings. It further signifies the role the 
traditional leaders can play vis-a vis these characteristics on that socio-cultural ground for 
purposes of mobilization and nation-building. This confirms that the institutional, economic, 
and bureaucratic measures used to evaluate democratization and nation-building are not 
adequate without the socio-cultural factors. These socio-cultural factors do not need to be 
individualism and capitalism by necessity as have been espoused. For the organizations of 
the traditional leaders in the above-narrated era were established on the socio-cultural values 
of the Sudanese people and was grounded in their historical experience as a society. 
Moreover, we do not expect a democratic integration of the traditional leaders in a 
colonial regime. But we observed that the role of the traditional leaders was further promoted 
and strengthened when integrated in the central government -albeit a colonial government- or 
when given the required latitude to pursue their activities. An example of this was when 
Sayyid Abdu Alrahman was allowed to cultivate his family’s estates, when his support 
needed during World War I and allowed to mobilize the people freely. Another example was 
When World War II was anticipated, and when some of the southern leaders were given the 
chance to participate in a conference the result was the cancelation of movement restrictions. 
Thus, the experience of the interaction between the colonial British and the traditional leaders 
in Sudan highlights the import of the attitude of the central authorities toward the traditional 
leaders and the effects of that attitude on their activities. The more permissive and 
constructive that attitude is, the more productive the traditional leaders could be in the 
society. Additionally, the failing attempts of the British government to impose traditional 
leaders or to create parallel leaders in order to eradicate the influence of the existing ones 
offer particular valuable lessons. First, in order for the chiefs and leaders to be appealing, 
their legitimacy should be driven from the existing socio-cultural ground and the historical 
experience of the community. Second, it is essential to interpret the social reality of the 
community and acknowledge their dynamics in order to implement a significant positive 
change. Third, it is critical to approach the attempted change while being considerate of those 
communities’ views and how they perceive their wellbeing. Fourth, and the most important, 
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is to forge policies that serve the socio-economic and socio-political needs of those 
communities instead of seeking means of controlling them or seeking ways to “modernizing” 
them.  
Additionally, acknowledging the achievements of the traditional leaders during the 
colonial era in Sudan is illuminating for both theoretical and practical purposes. That is, the 
achievements of the traditional leaders in education, agriculture, publication, and political 
mobilization add to theories of democracy and participation that the values upon which the 
Western democracies were built are not the sole key factors to democracies’ success as has 
been promoted. Rather, values and cultures of other societies have the capabilities of 
nurturing popular participation on their own grounds. Also, defining the bases of democracy 
and participation from single perspective is misleading and futile when applied on different 
contexts. For instance, if it has been concluded that African societies are inherently prone to 
failing states, it is because of the premises, upon which this conclusion was built, were 
erroneous. For, when addressing the African societies, analysts look for the features and 
historical factors that made the story of the Western societies. When the present features in 
Africa do not match the deterministically assumed elements of success, based on the Western 
story, it is concluded that there is a puzzle or that there are inherent factors of failure. This 
contributes to theories in democracy the element of diversity, a compelling realistic fact of 
humans’ societies, instead of assessing governance on singular perspective of capitalism or 
individualism. That is, to revise the measures held by the epistemic communities on the 
concepts of good governance and participation and the necessary ground for their success, or 
at least to revisit the proposed means and processes to achieve the good governance. Hence, 
the practical implication of such illumination is that in attempting to achieve social change in 
the direction of democratization and popular participation, it is an imperative to approach the 
traditional leaders and facilitate their involvement in such projects. This includes the process 
of understanding their communities as a whole of inseparable parts and considering their own 
interpretation for their needs and how to attain them. We should also examine the relation 
between traditional leaders and the central authority in terms of their position in the total 
political system of the country and the attitude of the central authority toward them. Then 
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transform this relationship into a positive and constructive relationship that aims at 
promoting participation and nation-building. . 
Post-colonialism 
1956-1969 
The political structure and the events during the British rule laid the foundation for 
the multiple problems that faced the country in the consequent periods, and the consecutive 
Sudanese regimes perpetuated those problems. This is especially true in the rural areas in 
general and the in south in particular. The post-colonial period witnessed the dramatic shift 
of power centers from the rural areas to the center represented in the urban settings where the 
economic and political activities were concentrated. This created the fundamental rural-urban 
discrepancy in regards to issues of socio-economic development. Henceforth, from this part 
on, we will treat the rural as correspondent term for the traditional communities because they 
are the areas where the traditional communities exist. This will have analytical implication 
for our thesis. For, the traditional communities in the previous section were part of both the 
center and the rural areas where their leaderships were dealing with the government while 
maintaining their heavy political weight in the rural areas. After the independence and due to 
a confluence of socio-economic factors, the concentration of political power in the urban 
setting became more apparent. It brought with it social changes in those urban settings which 
eliminated the possibility of traditional organization along with its traditional leadership.  
Hence, when addressing traditional communities with their leadership in this section, 
we refer to the rural areas where such structure exists. We will discuss why it is important to 
integrate the traditional leadership of the rural areas in a democratic national structure. In 
doing so, we will maintain the reference to the central authority’s attitude, as has been stated 
in the theory, as critical factor on determining the reactions and roles of the traditional 
leadership and the outcomes of this on the local and national levels. We will explore the 
maneuvers exerted by different regimes in regards to the traditional communities in the rural 
areas. In addition, we will explain how the identification with the leadership and its 
representational power are crucial for a sustainable democratic structure at the local level of 
these communities and on the national level. This representation is contingent to its 
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legitimacy as socio-culturally driven leadership that corresponds with the worldview of the 
community as opposed to being imposed leadership or worldview. Through this, we will 
notice that it is impossible to separate between the events as results of the precedent eras and 
as causes for the current manifestations of the lack of representation of the cultural multiple 
groupings of Sudanese society which led to the rural-urban imbalances. These manifestations 
include the absence of sustainable development, poverty, unemployment, conflicts, civil 
wars, and displacement. 
Following the independence of Sudan the centers of power were heavily concentrated 
in the capital in particular and in other urban areas in general. The rural areas were relied 
upon more for electoral purposes where the two major parties increased the rural 
constituencies in 1957, a move acquired them the majority of the seats in the parliament 
(Warburg, 1979). Additionally, and as has been discussed above, the “south policy” 
presented a perfect recipe for deepened inequalities, momentous grievances, and, 
subsequently, a civil war. Then, the governments took over either dealt with these issues 
heedlessly or contributed to them. For instance, in 1953, in the “Sudanization” process, only 
eight leaders, among eight hundred, represented the south. That was facilitated by the lack of 
politically organized southern entities and the isolation of the south and made it easier for 
this disproportionate representation to occur. In addition, the southerners also were not 
represented in the negotiations with Britain and Egypt in regards of the future of Sudan. 
Obviously, it was due to the “south policy” where they were subjected to cultural and 
political siege. That was changed, though slightly, after Juba Conference, where some leaders 
became the mouthpiece of the south. Expectedly, a number of riots took place in the south in 
1953 and followed by a strike of the Azandi workers in 1955. The grievances of the 
southerners were expressed again in the rebellion of the Equatorial Corps Sudan Defense 
force in 1955. These events were the heralds of the civil war in the south which commenced 
in 1958 (Khalid, 1990). 
These scenarios were far from being exclusively a south problem; other parts of the 
country, though less internationally pronounced, expressed the same grievances. For 
instance, the Darfur Development Front in the west, the Nuba Mountains Union in the south 
west, and the Beja in the east began to exhibit the results of negligence since 1953. In 1958, 
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the Beja Conference was formed where it called for autonomy of the eastern parts, 
development, social services, and representation in the parliament. Similar movements 
existed in the north and should have warned against the alienation of the country’s minorities 
and majorities. Even those entities such as Farmers Unions and Trade Unions, which were 
supposed to play a unifying role by including rural areas, were succumbed to the capital’s 
polity (Khalid, 1990). The ruling parties neglected the omnipresent discrepancies of 
development and the results of exploitation left by the colonial rule. They rather were 
preoccupied by the sectarian divisions. Also, their policies were highly influenced and 
confused by the international East-West tensions. Consequently, General Ibrahim Aboud 
military regime took over in 1958 (Khalid, 1990). Moreover, in 1958, the southerners 
demanded federation, equal status for English with Arabic and for Christianity with Islam, 
separate military forces in the south consistent exclusively with southerners. When these 
demands were rejected and the government insisted on adhering to more unitary system the 
southerners walked out of the parliament; an incident paved the way for an escalated south 
problem (Lesch, 1998).  
The fact that the military coup took over without encountering resistance indicates a 
fragile rule if not the longing of the people for a relief. This had much to do with the 
concentration of power in the urban center and in hands of the few. The military regime 
made some changes in the managerial level. It attempted to set a representative government 
especially in the rural areas and form system of local, provincial, and central councils.  But 
the fact that it was a military regime was not accepted by the public and the growing 
resistance led to boycotting these councils and rendered them unproductive. The criticism 
hailed on this setting that it was similar to the British “Advisory Council” of 1943 which the 
people detested and boycotted. Additionally, the local councils were run by the government 
officers who were, especially in the south, did not represent the grass-root and the decision 
making did not involve local people. It was considered merely mimicry of the national 
parliament; drawn from narrow base and largely unrepresentative (Khalid, 1990). Moreover, 
the problem of the south was considered an artificial problem and the federalism and 
separation were regarded harmful to the future of the country therefore it was thought to be 
resolved by unification measures. Subsequently, the British missionaries were expelled, 
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education was unified, and Arabic was introduced as the medium of instruction. Those who 
resisted were dealt with in a military fashion. This deepened the southerners’ grievances and 
brought the demise of the regime later on (Warburg, 1979). Additionally, the regime also was 
influenced by the international Western-Eastern tensions especially in the issue of economic 
development; a fact hindered any type of progress on that field (Khalid, 1990).  
Similar situation remained in the eastern parts among the Beja, Darfur in the west, 
and other rural areas. Moreover, in 1959, the regime was challenged by members of armed 
forces upon an agreement with Egypt to establish the Aswan dam. Those members had ties 
with the Nubian groups in the north who would be displaced by establishing the dam. Also, 
the Fur held several meetings to endorse the southerners’ demands (Lesch, 1998). And since 
other parts of the country did not take arms yet, no serious considerations made to address 
the rural-urban discrepancies. The traditional leaders of the opposition party wrote a 
declaration on which they collected thousands of the people’s signatures asking for 
democratic rule and the release of the arrested persons. That was followed by workers’ 
strikes, farmers’ resistance, trade union’s protest, and students’ union demonstrations. Also, 
in 1963 the armed resistance movement Anya-Nya appeared in the south and an open revolt 
flamed the south. Additionally, following students’ debates on the country’s problem the 
government took harsh measure to silence them. That was followed by massive strikes and 
demonstrations and was culminated by October 1964 revolution upon which the military 
regime handed over to a new civilian authority which ran  elections in 1965.This government 
was dominated by the two major traditional parties and ruled until 1968 elections which 
showed in its results the dominance of traditional forces in Sudan. For among the 218 seats 
of the parliament the two major parties with their traditional leads won 167 seats. The 
remaining seats went to the socialists, the two southern parties, the Nuba in the south western 
parts, and the Beja tribes in the eastern parts of the country (Warburg 1979). This indicates 
the profound influence of the traditional elements on Sudanese society and their substantial 
role on affecting the course of socio-political events. 
It is important to note that the transitional government, led by Sir- Alkhatim gained 
more respect and relative trust from the southerners. That was because of his attempts to 
solve the south problem by inviting all the groups of the south and talk to them directly. This 
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point substantiates our theory where it signifies the importance of the attitude of the central 
authority toward the traditional communities and their leaderships on determining their 
actions on the local and the national levels. Although the southerners did not speak with a 
unified voice, ultimately they called for self determination. Upon that a committee was 
established to form the recommendations which were erupted by the 1965 elections. The 
fighting in the south made voting in 1965 and, thereby, the representation in the parliament 
impossible for three years which more furthered the problem (Lesch, 1998).  
Investigating the period after independence using our theoretical tools, we observe 
that the major change was the shift of the power of the traditional leaders, represented in the 
major political parties, from the rural areas to the urban areas where they became the holders 
of the central authority. This shift was only on the individual leaderships and their location 
because, in reality, they were very reliant on their electorates in the rural areas. But that 
reliance did not translate into actual programs of development or practical policies for 
improving the socio-economic problems. The leadership of the traditional forces was highly 
absorbed by the sectarian divisions and the international Eastern- Western tensions. The fact 
that they relied on the rural areas to carry the parliament indicates that they still had their 
linkages in those areas. But the fact that those areas were suffering socio-economically 
indicates that these linkages were not made use of for good governance purposes. This 
necessitates introducing institutional rules of accountability and review which supports our 
theoretical argument that by integrating traditional leaders in the traditional communities we 
bring necessary institutional change to the local community. Also, looking at the fact that 
certain areas took arms and some other areas formed organized groups to represent them 
ethno-politically, we infer that there was bias in representing the traditional forces of the 
country.  The bias was manifested in the concentration of power in hands of the leaders of in 
the urban centers and specifically in the capital. Interestingly, that bias was carried on a 
democratic process where the domination of certain parties could always outvote the rest of 
the nation’s elements. This highlights the fact more sufficient democratic measures are 
required to guarantee the representation of the society. 
Although that bias in the center might not be intentional and had much to do with the 
historical courses of events, neglecting the issue does not exonerate the leaders from their 
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national responsibilities. For if the cultural and social groupings of Sudan were considered as 
a compelling reality and dealt with in a comprehensive manner and just framework, different 
scenarios of representation and governance could have taken place. For instance, if the 
traditional leaders and chiefs of the cultural groups were negotiated with or involved in needs 
assessment, policy formation, or building structure of representation, many of the issues 
concerned their communities would have been seriously addressed. This, indeed, required the 
awareness of the elites in the central authority of the necessary steps for nation-building 
through the participation of the traditional elites and their communities. Furthermore, the fact 
that the traditional leaders of the center, then, did not tackle the issue of equal development 
and good governance at that time with direct responsibility perpetuated the chronic dilemmas 
of the country’s poverty and conflicts plague the country to date.   
In addition, considering the fact that even the rural areas that supported the traditional 
leaders in the center suffered from socio-economic problem signifies the problematic type of 
the relationship between those leaders and their bases. It indicates that it is important to 
introduce accountability as critical element of governance. Therefore, the integration of the 
traditional leaders could play the role of introducing the institutional practices and 
democratic rule to the local communities. This is possible to be established within the socio-
cultural ethos of the society which advocates collective responsibility as essential value of 
the community upon which a lot of social activities of solidarity and support of Sudanese 
society find their bases. The accountability measure could also be founded by introducing 
institutional measures of conduct by engaging the traditional elites in institutional activities 
on the national level. Thus, from this discussion, we infer the importance of addressing two 
measures of representing these communities. First, it is important to integrate the traditional 
leaders as a tool for comprehensive representation and nation-building process. That is 
because relying only on the classic democratic procedures of elections and voting did not 
guarantee equally considering the demands of all the nation’s groupings.  Second, it is 
important to address the nature of the relationship between the traditional leaders and their 
bases especially in the rural areas. For if the leaders in the center relied on the votes of their 
bases in the rural areas but did not address their socio-economic problems, an accountability 
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standard needed to be sought.  That would be a part of introducing the democratic rules and 
institutional practice to the local communities as part of a profound democratization process. 
Furthermore, we noticed that the same problem of rural-center imbalance continued 
into the military regime of General Aboud, where the attempts to represent the rural areas 
and their traditional groupings did not take the issues of development and representation 
from nation-building perspective. Rather the regime walked the familiar path of narrow 
representation of the public by establishing the councils and appointing government officers 
to them. This eliminated the decision making as a community and grass-roots driven process. 
Indeed, this would debilitate, as we have observed, the legitimacy of these councils at the 
local level and make them less attentive to the communities’ interests. This, again, confirms 
the import of engaging the local traditional elites in such institutional processes where they 
have more appeal to their communities and are more attentive to their needs. This point finds 
its support within the argument about social capital and traditional authority where traditional 
authority drives its legitimacy from being part of the community’s cultural system but at the 
same time reliant on the social capital and networks of the community to maintain its 
legitimacy.  Importantly, this legitimacy is reciprocated by being attentive to the 
community’s needs and being an influential leading participant of it. These bases of analysis 
are crucial when addressing the issues of rural representation, development, and nation-
building because they reveal the real socio-cultural and socio-political dynamics of these 
communities. Ignoring these structural facts of those communities would lead to the observed 
undesirable outcomes of instability on the short and/or long run. This, again, confirms that 
the traditional leadership is vital to be integrated in a national democratic structure.  
1969-1985 
In 1969, a group of army officers, named the “Free Officers”, led by Numiri took 
over the government claiming that there was a need to eradicate the traditional forces from 
the political scene of the country. Upon their rhetoric against the traditional forces, an 
uprising erupted in 1970 in Aba Island, the cradle of the Mahdists and their heir traditional 
forces. That revolt was brought down by a brutal military action and the blood bath 
weakened them as a group. The other major traditional force, led by Sayyid Ali, remained 
silent. That was attributed to the fact that the Mahdists, unlike the Sayyid Ali’s followers, 
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consider their strong political role as inseparable from their religious belief. In his fight 
against the traditional forces, Numiri allied with the communist party which had strong 
presence among workers, peasants, students, and the professionals. He, majorly, relied on 
their organizational skills which were proven successful in 1964 and 1967. But they opposed 
his brutal military measures against the traditional communities (Warburg, 1979). In regards 
to the south problem, the new military regime promoted regional autonomy within a united 
Sudan. Upon this the “government would recognize the cultural and historical differences 
between the north and the south and the southern people have the right to develop their 
respective cultures and traditions within a united socialist Sudan” (Lesch, 1998:46). 
Therefore, Numiri’s appointee as minister of southern affair was a southerner who 
participated in the negotiation committee during the transitional government of 1965.  
Upon these moves and according the orientation of the regime, the Addis Ababa 
agreement was signed in 1972 between the south and north ending the war for the first time 
in seventeen years. The south became one region with one regional assembly which would 
elect High Executive Council. This regional government was responsible for social, cultural, 
and economic affairs with financial support from the central government. Decentralization 
was incorporated with proportional representation in the center. This was important because 
“equal representation in the center alone always ended in a south being a minority and 
regional self-government alone always led to “getthoization” of the south” (Lesch, 1998:45). 
Although Arabic remained the country’s official language, English was designated as the 
principal language of the south and the indigenous languages of the south were taught in 
schools. That Act was incorporated in the constitution and could only be changed by three-
quarters vote in the national assembly and two thirds of the southern electorate. Also, 
according to the Act, Islam and Christianity should be respected along with the indigenous 
“noble spiritual beliefs” (Lesch, 1998). The most radical change occurred by the creation of 
what was called the “People’s Local government” a program designed to mobilize people to 
participate in system of governance from grass-root level. The grass-root unit of it in the rural 
areas was the village and the encampment of the nomads while in the urban areas it was the 
block. This program was made as part of a strategy of “opening to the rural areas”.  Its goal 
was to cater for the cultural and ethnic heterogeneity of the Sudanese society and to put an 
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end to the uneven development. This period witnessed notable economic success and 
stability especially in previously stressed rural areas. Numiri’s government, for at least the 
first ten years of it, was dominated by technocrats who were non-ideological liberal 
academics operating its different offices and ministers. In the light of our thesis, the positive 
outcomes of recognizing the society’s diversity and tailoring the government’s strategies and 
policies to meet this diversity were positive evidence for our theory. For the representation of 
cultural groupings in a national system produced progress in the development of the rural 
areas and their traditional communities. Additionally, the attitude of the Numiri’s rule, at that 
period, was the driving force for such change which is another evidence for our theory that 
the central authority’s attitude and intensions is a decisive element of the integration process 
and its outcomes. 
Furthermore, the deterioration of the local governments and their diminished popular 
participatory role which occurred later on was attributed, by some analysts, to the lack of 
political will in the center, weakness of commitment from below when observing the 
obstacles from above, and the expelled tribal elites tried to hinder the process because they 
were not involved (Khalid, 1990:266). This analysis validates our theory that the absent 
political will of the central authority affected the local government. Another significant point 
is that the excluded traditional leaders were hindering factors to the process. This also 
supports my theory as it responds to the argument that the traditional leaders should be 
excluded because they challenge the democratization process. For the events mentioned-
above indicate that excluding the traditional leaders, because they are obstacles, does not 
bring about the desired outcomes and the probability of a sustainable process with them 
included is higher than without them. 
Moreover, upon the allocation of natural resources in different parts of the periphery 
areas of the south, Numiri started to contest the geographic affiliations of these areas. This, 
accompanied by the drastic economic needs of the south, stirred the tensions between the 
southerners and the government. These events, along with allocation of northern troops in the 
south, abrogated the Addis Ababa agreement.  In addition, there was sentiment in the south 
against the domination of the Dinka tribe in their bureaucratic system. Consequently, Numiri 
re-divided the region into three provinces, dissolved the High Executive Council, appointed 
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governors to the provinces, controlled revenues, and shifted the army’s control to the center. 
Southern politicians contributed to the erosion of the agreement by allowing Numiri to 
intervene when it benefited them personally (Lesch, 1998). This was, again, an indicative of 
the incomplete pluralist system where the participation of traditional and local communities 
was eroded and control from the center reappeared to generate the witnessed negative 
outcomes. 
Additionally, during this late period of his rule, domestically, Numiri was mainly 
supported by the radical Islamist group the NIF-after he had shifted his orientation from 
secularism- which gave him public support after losing it. This increased the tension in the 
south and some parts of the country further because it violated the recognition of the 
multiplicity of cultures and the diversity in Sudan. When the Islamists promoted the Sharia 
law in Numiri’s regime, it was highly denounced and condemned by religious leaders, Sufi 
leaders, Republican Muslims, professionals and the general public because it violated the 
constitution and discriminated against non-Muslims. That was followed by resignation of 
thousands of doctors and strikes of many professional sectors expressing their denunciation 
(Lesch, 1998). In the rest of the rural areas there was drought and desertification in Darfur 
and Kordofan in the west, and the Beja region in the east which drove thousands of people to 
the urban centers. Despite that, under pressure from the IMF and the U.S, which maintained 
good relation with the regime, Numiri imposed “austerity measures” and decreased the 
public expenditure and lift goods’ subsidies; a fact that devaluated the currency and led the 
prices of goods to soar. The impact of that was most drastic in the rural areas and traditional 
communities where the development was already in stalemate. This instigated massive 
strikes and riots in all societies sectors led by professionals’ unions and students’ unions. 
Then, the war in the south was resumed in 1983. The public resentment in the rest of the 
country continued through massive demonstrations, strikes, and resignation until it was 
culminated by April 1985 revolution which ended the rule of Numiri and set a transitional 
government (Lesch, 1998). 
By examining Numiri’s rule, we observe that when his government was oriented 
toward openness to the rural areas and their traditional communities, the standards of 
economic development, stability, and popular participation and even peace were on the 
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positive part of the axes. This was achieved by; first, recognizing the cultural and ethnic 
heterogeneity of the Sudanese society as was espoused in Addis Ababa agreement in 1972. 
That recognition was translated in actual policies to represent the traditional communities and 
launch development projects in the rural areas. Then, we notice that the factors provided by 
the analysts to explain the deterioration of the local government and lack of popular 
participation after their successes signal the points promoted by our thesis. They can be 
elaborated as follows: first, the attitude of the central authority toward these local entities 
where the ruler became less committed to the notion of public participation. This was 
obvious on the lack of administrative and financial support from the center to those entities. 
Second, the exclusion of the tribal elites created a hindrance to these entities to perform 
either because they were disenchanted by their exclusion or because of their existential 
influence on their community. Whatever the case was, it indicates that integrating the 
traditional elites is crucial for the success of local institutions and popular participation. This 
is either to eliminate their counterproductive role, if there is such possibility as has been 
argued by some, by engaging them in institutional practices, or to harness their influence for 
development and nation-building purposes. This confirms our proposition that the integration 
of the traditional leadership matters and the attitude of the central government toward them is 
essential for their positive contribution.   
Furthermore, it is needless to say that the shift of Numiri’s ideology from the extreme 
left to the extreme right had its profound impacts on the society on many aspects. What 
concerns us here is that by adopting the Sharia laws and other homogenization measures, 
Numiri’s rule relegated the cultural diversity with its various traditional communities of the 
country to non-existence. In Addition, we notice that the application of these laws was 
correlating with the instability and economic deterioration in different parts of the country 
but much more in the south. This was simply because Sudan is religiously and culturally a 
heterogeneous country, and within the Muslim population there were diverse schools of 
thoughts which some of them disagreed with the application of the Sharia laws. Thus, we can 
soundly put forth that the lack of representation of these cultural communities in a solid 
national structure had very much to contribute to that denigration. For instance, if these 
traditional communities were represented, their mere existence in organized bodies would 
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have signified the government’s recognition to them, and, thereby, would have been offered 
the due respect. Thus, the integration of traditional elites in institutional system is forcefully 
symbolic of the country’s cultural and ethnic diversity. By that, every leader in the center 
would contemplate this compelling fact when ironing a law, policy, or an administrative 
decision. That would have obviated the consequences of imposing a single worldview on the 
traditional communities which generated the civil war and the displacement of the rural 
populations. 
1985-1989 
By the advent of April 1985 revolution, a new democratic era was set on the stage. 
The previous rule left behind three major crises: the controversy over the application of the 
Sharia Law, the civil war, and the broken economy. All of these problems were related to the 
urban-center discrepancy and to the representation and participation of the diverse 
communities of Sudan. The first conundrum was about the bases of the rule and the 
worldview where the application of Sharia law was promoted by radical Islamists and 
strongly opposed by secularists, Christians, and other African traditions. Even some of the 
political forces in the center, represented in the major two parties, that embraced popular 
religious beliefs -although opposed Sharia upon its application- did not have motives to 
strongly oppose it later on because it did not radically negate their general belief system. In 
addition, during the elections, there was intense fighting in the south; a fact resulted in very 
low rate of voting in the south. In addition, the Islamic National Front NIF, which was 
known for its highly organized bodies, managed to get the additional seats allocated for the 
graduates in the south besides unexpected high percentages of votes in the rest of the country. 
These conditions led to overrepresentation of the radical Islamist group in the new 
government. Although, Al Mahdi, the new prime minister, would try to modify the Sharia 
Law with new code that satisfy all parties, the overrepresentation of the National Islamic 
Front NIF and underrepresentation of the southern parties precluded that strategy. (Lesch, 
1998) So, the democratic system which, for matters of representation and participation, 
depended only on the voting would not guarantee the rights of the minorities because they 
would be outvoted. That point, again, necessitates a type of structural representation of the 
traditional communities with real equal rights to those of the majorities.  
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In addition, the economic struggles left by Numiri’s regime continued to exacerbate 
especially in the rural areas where there was no palpable improvement and no clear vision for 
the future. Upon the negotiations of the government with the IMF there was striking increase 
of prices of goods, which heavily impacted the rural areas and subsequently the 
demonstrations hit the streets. In the south, the prime minister replaced the HEC by the 
council for the south and its head, politicians, and the governors were chosen from the 
southern parties. The disagreement of the southerners on how to rule gave the prime minister 
the free hand to act and choose the leaders of the council and the governors in south. Upon 
this, some of the southern politicians withdrew from the cabinet leaving only three cabinet 
members from the south. Additionally, the tensions continued between the ruling parties over 
the bases of governance. The Islamists were pushing for more radical Sharia laws and the 
secular, some of Muslims, and African parties were pushing for secularism. Moreover, by the 
escalating tensions in the center and violence in the south and the west, the government-
supported militia was armed to fight the rebellion in the south and the west, a move decried 
by some members of the cabinet. Some of the political parties composed an opposition and 
negotiated with the southern rebellions and reached an agreement in 1988 which was rejected 
by parties in power (Lesch, 1998). later on the prime minister, under pressure and the 
extensive divisions, decided to implement the agreement as a new program for the state and 
reconfigure the government. This move shelved the Islamic decree set by Numiri’s rule and 
his NIF partners. The NIF did not accept its loss of power and the rejection of its ideological 
bases by major political parties and the high command of the armed forces. Few hours before 
the parliament were to vote to freeze the Sharia law, an NIF-orchestrated coup captured 
power in June 1989.  
When we examine this period of the history of Sudan, we notice that the politicians in 
the center were preoccupied intensively with the cleavages over the Sharia law, which 
coincided with the economic deterioration in the rural areas of the south where the war did 
not allow for development.  This indicates a fundamental crisis of recognizing the cultural 
plurality of the Sudanese society. For, despite its democratic nature, the government failed to 
form a representative structure that emphasizes the country’s diversity by not imposing the 
radical Islamic worldviews on the non-Muslim communities. Also it failed to promote 
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participation on the bases of this diversity at the grass-roots level. Rather, the ethnic and 
cultural communities, especially in the rural areas, were excluded or politicized, polarized, 
and manipulated to serve the agenda of those in the center as the case of the militias in the 
west and southern west parts of Darfur and Kordofan. Indeed, this exacerbated economic 
conditions and escalated violence in the south, the west and the south west. Thus, we can 
assert that voting, as a democratic measure, was not adequate to guarantee the public 
representation, participation, and equal rights as we have seen. Rather, a more comprehensive 
structure needs to be created to mobilize the public for participation and development aims. 
The integration of traditional leaders in a representative national structure is one critical 
measure to guarantee that. This, as was mentioned before, assures the society’s diversity and 
increases the popular participation. That is because the cultural symbolism and identification 
with the leadership is a significant motivational element for participation. As has been 
noticed the imposition of a singular culture and worldview, the Sharia law for example, 
resulted in the marginalization and exclusion of these communities, and thereby, diminished 
their participation and escalated violence.  
Therefore, it is a necessity to involve all cultural and social views in a framework that 
affirms recognition and respect while facilitating communication between different 
communities. This is to say that the socio-cultural appeal of the leadership on the local level 
is crucial to create sense of belonging and motivate participation. The fact that some of the 
government members and political parties’ leaders belonged to these communities, pinpoints 
significant diagnostic direction. That is, the individual politicians’, from the rural areas, 
involvement in the center does not remedy the problem of representation and participation of 
the local communities since the ailments of governance continued to be if not worsened. 
Thus, a more radical solution needs to be established to address the issues of participation 
and development from the grass-roots level through the involvement of the traditional leaders 
and their communities.  This, on a different level, promotes nation-building on factual bases 
of the cultural diversity and ethnic pluralism of Sudan. To achieve that, the attitude of the 
leadership in the center is a critical factor to ensure the integration of the traditional leaders in 
a national structure to promote their positive contribution. That is by, first, acknowledging 
the reality of the diverse society, then, a commitment to building the nation through the 
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promotion of popular participation via an integrated traditional leadership. That integration 
must be designed to motivate participation in the development of the local communities and 
to facilitate views and interests to the center. The center’s role would be the financial and 
administrative support and facilitating the cross-communal communication for nation-
building aims. 
1989-Present 
The National Islamic Front fulfilled its threats during the democratic rule, when felt 
marginalized and disempowered by the majority, and executed a military coup in June 1989. 
The new NIF government, as other coups, declared that its primary mission was to salvage 
the country from the deteriorating socio-economic and socio-political conditions ravaging the 
society under the previous government. They argued that the democratic rule was divisive 
and Numiri’s rule was totalitarian. The NIF proposed the unmediated “popular participation” 
to manage, build, and secure the country. A mobilized public would fight corruption and 
promote production, they espoused, following Islamic virtues. Hence, they set up “popular 
salvation committees” for these goals and systemized them during the Conference for 
National Dialogue on the Political System in 1990. Following these talks, the government 
unexpectedly announced the establishment of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA). It 
was the first all-appointed parliament in Sudan’s history. Its members were appointed before 
the election of any of the local committees. So, instead of building the participatory system 
from the bottom, the process was reversed. This TNA incorporated major tribal leaders who 
were appointed to fortify its legitimacy. Despite that the TNA’s members were appointed to 
guarantee their loyalty, the legislations did not pass through it and sometimes were 
implemented even when disapproved by it. On the committees’ and local levels when the 
elections were held, the NIF fared very poor so the appointed head of these committees 
arbitrarily increased the NIF share of seats to outnumber other members. In some towns other 
“illegal” political parties won and the NIF members were decisively defeated. These events 
resulted in massive arrests and the elections were voided. On the national level there was 
virtual boycott for the elections where very few people went to participate. Additionally, the 
government dissolved all professional associations, unions, and civil organizations. The 
students’ and youth unions were also closed and only opened to be government-sponsored 
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agencies. The demonstrations, strikes, protests, and other kinds of political activism 
continued to resist the regime on different levels and through the span of the regimes’ rule. 
This of course resulted in massive arrests, exiles, and sometimes execution. Despite the 
abundant rejection of Sudanese public for the government, it continued its proclamations 
about ruling a unifying Sudan as Islamic state under Sharia law. This, indeed, marginalized 
and oppressed non-Muslims communities and secularists and exacerbated the civil war in the 
south and the Nuba Mountains since it was deemed a holy war (Lesch, 1989). 
Moreover, the literature on democracy has espoused that a capitalist globalized 
economy will lead to a politically open democratic system. That is, capitalism and globalized 
economy from one side and democracy from the other have been associated as variables that 
either lead to one another or mutually strengthen each other. By examining the rural areas 
and the traditional communities in Sudan under the economic reform of the NIF regime, we 
observe the socio-economic distress they have experienced as a result of the capitalist open 
economy. This is especially true in the areas where the subsistence agriculture has been 
altered to large crops schemes as in eastern Sudan. That is, ecological, political and economic 
factors have combined to create both a recurrent food security crisis and situation of chronic 
structural poverty for many of the rural households.  For instance, the recurrent droughts 
have decimated pasture and livestock herds, significantly reducing the sustainability of 
pastoral livelihoods (Assal and Ali, 2007). In addition, in the western part, despite its 
tremendous contribution to the national economy, the lack of services of health, veterinary, 
and water led to severe socio-economic distress. Furthermore, in regard to the southern part, 
Switzer discussed that the “efforts to appropriate land, for oil,  from groups without giving 
them a voice in the decision-making process and without what they perceive to be equitable 
compensation leads to rising social tensions and outbreaks of rebellion. This rise in social 
tensions is compounded by the environmental consequences of oil production that diminish 
the traditional sources of livelihoods” (Switzer, 2002). He also added that the government 
conducted brutal raids to clear the oil field from its indigenous people. This is in addition to 
the other pernicious effects of oil production on the traditional activities. For example, the 
production of oil is accompanied with changes on the landscape and affects the movement of 
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the pastoralists of the south and hinders the traditional farming. This is in addition to the 
contamination of water and soil which results in disease and death (Switzer, 2002).  
This discussion sends a signal that there is a need to revisit some of the premises of 
democratization and the measurement of good governance as it is usually associated 
deterministically with global economic activities. This is not to fundamentally refute the 
globalized capitalist economy or the benefits it generates on the national level. Rather, it is to 
revisit it as a variable usually linked to democracy and reevaluate the proposed mechanisms 
of initiating democratization and good governance on these bases without putting into 
account the impacts on the traditional communities and their socio-economic systems. Part of 
that, is to reconsider the measurement of economic growth by national income only because 
it does not reveal such ailments at the local levels. In addition, the economic difficulties in 
the rural areas are strongly related to the issues of political participation and representation of 
these communities. For instance, an integrated traditional leadership in a structure of 
governance would channel the concerns and interests of the local communities to the central 
government about their economic situation. It would also contribute to the assessment and 
planning for economic and social development projects in a way that would eliminate, or 
alleviate, the resultant distress on the traditional communities. The traditional leaders would 
indicate aspects that are not usually considered in the economic planning. For instance, they 
would explain the socio-cultural values of the economic resources of the traditional 
communities and how they relate to their worldviews. This will designate more sound 
mechanisms to foster socio-economic development without profoundly inflicting those 
communities. On the national level, such insights would obviate the social costs of poverty, 
war, disease, displacement, and families’ disintegration. 
To reflect on the above narrative of the current regime of the NIF in the light of our 
theory, we observe that the previously existing dilemmas of governance continued to worsen 
and impact the Sudanese society. Despite the complicated events and entangled scenarios, we 
can reduce the complexity of the situation to the previously mentioned conundrums: the 
imposition of Sharia law on non-Muslim communities, civil war, and economic development. 
These problems are interrelated and all resulted from the accumulated crisis of representation 
and participation of the diverse communities of Sudan. For the NIF government pursued its 
 62 
project, which was declared and commenced since Numiri’s rule, a project of Sudan the 
Islamic state. Hence, the changing factor in the NIF regime, compared to its predecessors, is 
that it is the sole holder of power without contenders. This gave it a free hand on radically 
changing the socio-political and socio-economic structure of the country despite the 
assiduous resistance of the public. In such a regime, we do not expect any attempts of 
representing different sectors of the societies; traditional or urban. But the fact that the NIF 
government tried to mobilize the public in different forms indicates the importance of 
participation and representation even for such tyrannical system. Another significant point is 
that when the NIF established its appointed parliament, it sought the involvement of the 
traditional leaders in it. This signifies the paramount import of traditional leaders for the 
legitimacy of any governance structure in a diverse society like the Sudanese. The fact that 
the appointed parliaments along with its local committees were doomed to failure is 
justifiable by their lack of appeal to the grass-roots level population.  For instance, if the 
traditional communities were integrated in a manner that acknowledges the diverse 
composition of the society and ensures its communities’ rights to pursue their worldviews, 
the socio-political events would have taken different direction. This manner would be in an 
integrated traditional leadership which the local communities could identify with and have 
sense of belonging to. Also, as previously mentioned, the mere fact of integrating the 
traditional leaders is an indicative of the government’s recognition and respect for the varied 
views of the Sudanese society.  
This would have been manifested, for example, in alternative economic solutions for 
the distressed traditional economic activities or different manners of implementing the 
economic projects. For example, a prior research and investigation on these communities’ 
socio-cultural and socio-economic system as a whole of inseparable parts would have 
revealed the interconnectedness of its different aspects and their relation to their worldviews. 
Such results would have identified alternative ways for economic and social development 
projects in these areas to obviate the social cost of destabilizing these communities. The 
integration of the traditional leaders in a structural manner would avail the sources of such 
consultation to voice the views and concerns of these communities. This confirms that the 
integration of the traditional leaders would promote economic development in the right 
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direction. It is needless to say that a socio-economically stable community is well-suited to 
participate in issues of development and governance than a distressed community. This 
stability, indeed, is accompanied by a sense of belonging to the socio-cultural community 
under a legitimate appealing leadership. This is as opposed to the NIF’s appointed leaders or 
their imposed worldview. That confirms our theory on the conditionality of the attitude of the 
central authority and the importance of an appealing leadership on the local level with a 
worldview the traditional communities could identify with for popular participation in 
development and nation-building goals.  
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CHAPTER 5.  JABARONA CAMP FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE 
Phoenix Community 
The protracted civil wars and conflicts, plus problems of development, had rampant 
social impacts on different parts and various aspects of society. Nevertheless, drastic impacts 
are more apparent in rural areas. One resultant phenomenon of these impacts is the 
displacement of the impacted communities. In Sudan, given the previous narratives, there are 
many displaced people’s camps around the urban centers. In their new locations, the 
displaced people are faced with various types of stress and hardships pertaining to their loss 
of livelihood and the challenges of coping with the new conditions. Given the exceptional 
circumstances under which they live, an investigation of traditional leadership in this 
different setting was conducted to examine whether the importance of the traditional leaders 
is only relevant in the original communities in their natural physical and virtual worlds under 
the normal circumstances. If not, then the traditional leaders’ role is a profound component of 
these communities’ identities and an ingrained part of their socio-cultural system and, 
thereby, plays important role in sustaining their sense of belonging and stability. It was 
important to ascertain the effects of displacement because it identifies the ground upon which 
this research can establish grass-roots level structures of participation. From that level, one 
can defer to the nation-building projects that promote inter-communal communication and 
popular participation at the national level. This proposition was established upon the premise, 
as discussed previously, that the socio-cultural ground is a critical part of promoting 
participation under common sense of belonging and recognition of others. 
Background and General Description: 
Jabarona camp for the Internally Displaced People (IDPs) is the largest camp for the 
(IDPs) in Khartoum the capital of Sudan which is located to the west of Omdurman. Its 
distance from Khartoum province is 25kms (security office records). The camp was 
established in 1991 by a decision of the Governor of Khartoum, after his order to transfer the 
(IDPs) from Khartoum North Province. Later, various groups of IDPs in the dispersed areas 
of the capital were also transferred to this camp. The area of the camp is not specified due to 
the increasing number of coming people since its establishment (Semi-structured interview). 
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In 1992, there were 68,936 people living in the camp and, among them, 9,847 families (Care 
Report 1992).  
At the time of this research, Jabarona camp was inhabited by 175, 000 individuals, 
which included 28, 000 individual families, according to the last census. These people came 
from the war-affected regions, areas affected by tribal conflict, drought, and decertification. 
The majority of these people are from southern and western states, especially southern 
Kordofan. Southern tribes comprise 60% of the inhabitants, among which the Dinka tribe 
represents 40% of the southern tribes. In addition, the Nuba tribe, which represents 30% of 
the population of the camp, has 48 Nuba-tribe groups in the camp, Equatorial tribes 15%, the 
Nuer 3%, and the Shilluk 3%. The rest are comprised of Kordofan and Darfur tribes and 
Falata tribes (The Humanitarian Commission (HAC) Report 2001). In the beginning, when 
the camp was newly established, each tribe settled in an isolated living quarter. However, 
now they are mingling and nothing distinguishes them except their local languages. There are 
16 elementary schools and one high school in the camp. These schools are either under the 
supervision of a church or the Ministry of Education. They employ 130 teachers and are 
supported by UNICEF and the Islamic Call (Dawa) Organization. There are no electricity 
lines in the camp, but some individuals own generators y who rent electricity to the 
inhabitants of the camp. A transportation line links the camp with the nearest market center. 
It is operated by a number of minibuses under the supervision of the security office of the 
camp. There are also some carts available for inter-camp transportation. 
The predominant economic activity in the camp is vending in the marketplace. Most of 
the workers in the market are women who sell tea, food and vegetables. There are also small 
shops for retail supplies which are operated by men. Some shops sell communication 
services, and there are also a few cloth and tailor shops. A few video clubs are owned by 
individuals as income sources. Some individuals own electric generators as sources of 
income. A few people sell traditional wines. There is some prostitution. In addition, many of 
the IDPs work as marginal venders in city markets. Some camp inhabitants have joined the 
armed forces. (Observation and interviews).  
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Administration 
In regards to the administration of the camp, politically, the camp belongs to the 
Omdurman municipality; however, the actual administration is under the Humanitarian 
Commission (HAC), a government agency concerned with humanitarian activities. 
Administration is accomplished through chiefs and other native administrators. There is also 
a security and external affairs division of HAC in the camp as well as a police office which 
belongs to the Ministry of the Interior (Semi-structured interview). The camp is divided 
administratively into two major sections; each further divided into 32 blocks. Each block has 
its administrative committee to which the youth committee and the women’s committee are 
affiliated. There are a considerable number of sultans (Chiefs) in the camp who represent 
tribal leadership and traditional courts. Each tribe has its own chief who solves conflicts and 
disputes within the tribe or between tribes. There are also other chiefs’ courts held 
periodically (weekly or every two weeks) to resolve conflicts amongst the members of the 
same tribe. There are also joint intertribal courts that have been very effective in resolving 
such conflicts. These courts are involved in the administration of the camp and, sometimes, 
they coordinate to guarantee neutrality in judgment. Important to this research is that the 
traditional leaders represent the primary authority in the camp wherein researchers, 
organizations, and institutions generally contact them for purposes of implementing projects 
or programs. Traditional leaders are consulted on issues such as how to approach the 
community or how to build committees, teams or training groups. The camp’s inhabitants 
also consult the traditional leaders about general information about the camps and its social 
or cultural problems. It is important to note that all the committees, teams, and organized 
entities in the camp are represented by individuals from each tribe in the camp. This is 
because the traditional leaders direct the people to include all segments of the camp 
community in their activities (semi-structured interview).  
At the time of the establishing the camp, each tribe resolved its problems internally 
since each tribe lived in isolation. Then, the Sultans convened and formed a council from 
amongst them to discuss all the affairs of the tribes as well as conflicts amongst individuals. 
This was the first common organization of the tribes and their sultans. Coincidently, the 
government had formed Shoura (Consultation) Councils in all the states of Sudan. Thus, a 
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similar Shoura Council was established in the camp, which incorporated all the chiefs and 
leaders of the tribes in the camp. These Shoura Councils convened regularly to discuss 
security, services and social issues. Later on, the Shoura Councils were dissolved after the 
formation of the popular committees as previously mentioned. Moreover, the traditional 
leaders also have clubs (shelters) where they meet regularly and discuss issues and form 
organized bodies for particular services. (The semi-structured interview)  
Socio-cultural activities 
Regarding the cultural and social activities in the camp, there are various types of 
societies and associations in the camp which are of tribal and non-tribal nature. The tribal 
associations serve the issues of a specific tribes and the non-tribal serve the camp’s as a 
community. They operate in various fields, most of which belong to the youth. The most 
active and famous associations and societies are the non-tribal ones. The governmental and 
non-governmental organizations also arrange seminars, workshops and training courses in 
the camp. Most of these activities are arranged for specific cultural programs. Moreover, 
there are many folklore bands in the camp which represent the majority of the Sudanese 
tribes. Each band has a director who leads the band under the supervision of the tribal 
leadership. These bands normally make their shows during the national occasions financed 
by the committees of the National Congress. They work during festivities such as Christmas, 
marriage, and national occasions. The bands also work in programs that are organized by 
some non-governmental institutions. They may work jointly or separately on these occasions. 
Generally, when the bands work jointly, all the people of the camp dance together on these 
occasions (Semi-structured interview). 
Fieldwork 
This research was conducted in Jabarona camp for the IDPs–Omdurman in Oct.-Dec 
.2005. The tools employed in this research were questionnaire, semi-structured interview, 
and focus group discussion. The participants of this research were asked about their 
engagement in the camp’s cultural, service, political, social, and religious activities. 
Moreover, the participants were also asked about perceptions and attitudes toward other 
tribes before and after the displacement. Additionally, the participants were asked about their 
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involvement in any sort of disputes and conflicts before and after the displacement and how 
they solved them. Appendix A provides tables summarizing the results of the fieldwork. 
The questions of this study were designed to explore the changes that have occurred 
on the displaced persons’ popular participation. The responses would serve verify the impact 
of integrating traditional leaders in institutions and organizational bodies. The questions also 
examined changes that occurred in the ethnic, cultural and political perceptions towards each 
other after their [the traditional leaders’] presence in the camp. This would investigate the 
potentiality of nation-building project via programs of popular participation and inter-
communal interactions through integrated traditional leadership in a national structure. In 
relation to this point, the questions were composed to learn to what extent they are peacefully 
interacting and accepting each other, and how they perceive the peaceful coexistence in the 
camp. More importantly, the questions sought to reveal the mechanisms that have led to these 
changes and the supporting factors with further focus on the impact of the integration of the 
traditional leaders in the governmental and non-governmental institutions. In addition, some 
questions addressed general social, economic and health situations to draw a full picture 
about the people of the camp and the conditions under which they live.  
In the questionnaire part of this study, there were 56% male and 44% female 
participants. The highest percentages were youth. Among those, 80% were 18 to 45 years of 
age (Appendix A-1). Most of the participants (46%) were adult before displacement. This 
fact helps in comparing livelihood conditions and aspects before and after displacement.  
The major reason for displacement, as predicted, was war (48%) (Appendix A-4). 
The draught and decertification caused 20% to move to seek jobs, wherea 16% moved for 
other reasons (A-4). The circumstances indicatin the displacement as a result of the rural-
urban discrepancies and their consequences. Moreover, the percentage of illiteracy among 
respondents was 54% (A-4). The highest level of education was the completion of high 
school (12%) (A-3). The rest of the categories ranged between primary and secondary. This 
indicates the total amount of education among displaced persons was between 18 to 56 years. 
This is a negative indication because those who belong to this category of age have the 
biggest impact on the community. Displaced people represent high illiteracy rate because 
stability and security are critical for education.  
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The majority of tdisplaced persons used to be farmers and pastoralists; 18% were 
pastoralists whereas 28% were farmers (A-3). The percentage of workers such as 
construction and tea selling was 6%; 24% were housewives; and 20% formerly were students 
(A-3). This provides evidence of the socio-economic distress impact the traditional 
communities.  
As shown in Appendix A-5, in comparison with the previous question, it was 
observed that the percentage of agriculture and grazing was zero after displacement. On the 
other hand, the percentage of workers increased from 6% to 40%. This indicates the socio-
economic distress and insecurities generated by the displacement. The percentage of house-
wives reduced from 24% to 22%. This means that women needed to work after displacement 
to meet their families’ needs after losing their husbands, brothers, and fathers in the war. The 
percentage of students also declined,from 20% to 8%, accompanied by an increase in 
military enlistment, from 5% to 10%. There was an increase in trade, from 4% to 8% and 
unemployment, from 0% before displacement to 12% after displacement. These factors 
indicate the economic and educational deterioration resulting from war, drought, lack of 
development and displacement. In addition, women had assumed different social roles which 
might have exposed them to greater involvement in the community activities. 
The following questions centered around disputes within the same tribe and between 
different tribes. These questions examined the level of conflict across tribes and to determine 
the source (intertribal or intra-tribal phenomenon) and how it has been affected by the 
displacement. The disputes and conflicts were few within one’s own tribe before 
displacement (2%) compared to (4%) after displacement. This could be attributed to 
solidarity and strong tribal ties among individuals within the tribe. They also could be 
attributed to the relative stability at their original homes. The slight increase in disputes 
within the tribe after displacement might be construed as weakness in tribal affiliations as the 
primary source of affiliation. However, in general, the percentage of disputes within a tribe 
before and after the displacement were low (2% and 4%). (See Appendix A-6, & A-7) 
Before displacement, 66% of the participants were involved in disputes or conflicts 
with another tribe/s than their own tribe (Appendix A-8). This percentage changed drastically 
(to 4% after the displacement). This fact could also be drawn on the other side of the same 
 70 
coin; 34% were not involved in any conflict or dispute before displacement, which increased 
to 96% foe “are not involved in any conflicts or disputes” after the displacement. These 
figures indicate that there was significant change in attitudes or perceptions between the 
different tribes, a fact that affirmed there were reasons or factors that led to this significant 
change and social peace in the camp. Compared to the previous number of conflicts within 
the same tribe, one could elicit that the major change occurred in the intra-tribal relations, 
perceptions, and attitudes. 
The participants who said that they were involved in any sort of conflict with other 
tribes were asked to articulate these tribes. The disputes before displacement took place in 
places where onflicts are well-known in Sudan, such as southern Kordofan, southern Sudan 
and western Sudan. It is important to observe that these are the same tribes that are living and 
interacting and cooperating in the camp. 
The participants were asked what the mechanism they consider to solve their 
disputes, conflicts and social problems. The highest percent (68%) considered the common 
court to be their resort. It is important to note that the common court is a type of court formed 
jointly by the traditional leaders from different tribes which were not existent before the 
displacement (Semi-structured interviews). The courts were comprised of of tribal leaders 
from each tribe that living in the camp. This is a significant point that a type of integration of 
the traditional leaders in mechanisms of conflict resolution. It is provides indication of the 
spirit of the mutual respect and social peace in the camp that resulted from this integration.  
As shown in Appendix A-11, all of the participants (100%) stated that they did not 
have any sort of membership or engagement with an organized body such as social, services, 
cultural or political committees before the displacement. Most (86%) of them said that they 
were now involved in some kind of activism with an organized body that belongs to either 
the government or to a non-governmental organization (A-12). Some of were affiliated with 
more than one organized body (A-12). This indicates that engagement in any social activism 
is a new phenomenon that occurred within their presence in the camp. This phenomenon was 
expected to have radical impact on their perceptions and attitudes toward each other. 
The total membership in non-governmental and the governmental organized bodies 
such as committees, societies, associations, and political parties was 86% (Appendix A-11). 
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All of the members were engaged in more than one institution or committee. These 
committees and coordinating bodies have created new environment for the various tribes to 
work and interact under the umbrella of the civil institutions upon civil principles and rules 
of affiliation. This is expected to raise awareness and introduce new laws of interaction and 
shared goals and interest. The types of the organized bodies mentioned in the questionnaire 
and the participants are involved with are governmental and non-governmental. This is 
strong evidence of increase in popular participation in the camp. 
Those who were affiliated to a political party numbered 44% of the participants, 18% 
of whom were active members (Appendix A-12). This indicates there is sort of commitment 
to a national political body regardless of the ethnic origin or the tribal background. This 
could be considered a significant addition to the national spirit and activism in issues of 
collective concern. In addition, these sorts of affiliations make the individual dedicate 
herself/himself to the institution the fact broadens the possibilities of loyalties and widens the 
awareness of the individual to encompass the common interests of the nation instead of 
narrowing them down to the tribal and ethnic interests.  
As shown in Appendix A-13, those who perform prayers in the mosques or in the 
churches numbered 62% of the participants and have sort of religious activity such as 
belonging to the mosques’ or churches’ committees. Among them 32% go regularly to 
perform their prayers, and 40% go sometimes to their mosques or churches. This finding is 
important because, as we have seen before that 28% of the participants were Muslims and 
18% are Christians. These religious affiliations are not related to their ethnic and tribal 
affiliations, that the individuals in each group have different tribal and ethnic backgrounds. 
So, having them being active together in any sort of religious activity would contribute to 
their interaction, understanding, respect and recognition.  These religious affiliations create 
chances for interactions between different tribes in the camp. The holy places, with their 
religious and spiritual atmosphere, create a good environment for interaction between the 
worshippers. The churches and mosques nominate people from different tribes to constitute 
administrative committees to run the mosque or the church. This is another pot for interaction 
among the (IDPs). This type of bodies are usually initiated and facilitated by the traditional 
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leaders. Thus, the integration of the traditional leaders in such types of committees stirs the 
public to participate in such activities. 
In summary, it has been shown that there is a significant increase of the popular 
participation and representation in the administrative and organizational committees and 
coordinating bodies in the camp. Among the camp dwellers, 86% were members in an 
organized body, council, party or committee. Additionally, despite the scarcity in resources 
and means of decent life, there is organized services provision and shared management in the 
camp. It is important to add that these organized entities organize the IDPs to achieve 
common visions and goals for the camp’s community. This was achieved by the equal tribal 
representation in the services committees and coordinating bodies. The equal representation 
was considered by the training providers after contacting the traditional leaders and 
consulting them on how to approach their communities. The representation of the tribes in 
the committees was considered as a critical condition of success of these programs. This fact 
proves that integrating the traditional leaders in institutions promote popular participation 
and leads to peaceful interaction and prevents tribal conflicts.  
In addition, 44% of the participants were members in political parties, among them is 
81% are active members in their political affiliation (Apendix A-12). This is considered a 
significant addition to the national spirit and the inclusive cause as opposed to the ethnic or 
tribal interest. In addition, 72% of the participants have sort of religious activity among them, 
32% are active religious individuals who go to prayers regularly or members churches’ and 
mosques’ in councils or committees (A-13). This is important especially if it is linked to the 
fact that there is 82% Muslims and 18% Christians. These religious affiliations are not 
connected to the tribal and ethnic backgrounds, that Muslims and Christians belong to 
different tribal groups. Therefore, and contrary to what has been promoted, the religious 
activity in any form of committee, council, or prayer group could serve as enhancing element 
for the cross-tribal linkages. That is because these members would work for an inclusive 
spiritual cause despite the ethnic and tribal consideration. This is specifically true if it has 
been recognized that some of these religious committees have services and social activities 
for the public in the camp. Thus, integrating the spiritual leaders, as traditional leaders, could 
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serve to promote popular participation through programs for the public good and by 
advocating for values that motivate community activism. 
In this light, the questionnaire confirmed that there is significant increase on popular 
participation in the IDPs camp. That is 86% of the questionnaire’s participants participate in 
organized bodies. This is compared to 0% membership in such entities before displacement. 
Hence, the integration of the traditional leaders in organized bodies and institutions has 
powerful potential of increasing the popular participation. This is because the traditional 
leaders serve as source of information and consultation that informs the direction and 
execution of different social programs. Additionally, traditional leaders also ensure the sense 
of belonging to common socio-cultural ground through their experience and leadership 
abilities. This gives motivation to the public to participate in issues of common concern since 
the type of leadership is not imposed upon them and they can identify with their worldview. 
Additionally, the questionnaire affirmed that there is decline in tribal conflict or 
violence between the tribes compared to when they were in their original places. That 66% 
stated that they were involved in a sort of dispute or conflict with another tribe before 
displacement. This percentage declined to 4% after the displacement. This confirms the fact 
that there is social peace and relative stability in the camp. In addition, it is shown that 68% 
of the participants consider the common court of the traditional leaders as a resort to solve 
their social problems. It is important to mention that these courts are composed in the camp 
by the chiefs of the different tribes. That means each tribe has a representative in the 
common court (semi-structured interviews). This fact strongly affirms the importance of 
integrating the traditional leaders in institutions to maintain stability and promote nation-
building.  
It is important to acknowledge that the integration of the traditional leaders, indeed, is 
not absolutely the sole sufficient factor led to the increase in popular participation. Rather, it 
is a necessary factor with significant importance. That was supported by several auxiliary 
conditions. Importantly, the financial, informational, and administrative support provided by 
the national and international organizations played substantial role on maintaining the 
activities in the camp. This point signifies that, on the national level, the attitude of the 
central state is crucial to play a similar supportive and facilitative role for the integration of 
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the traditional leadership in a national structure. Furthermore, other factors might have 
contributed to the increase of the popular participation such as the harsh circumstances which 
strengthen the IDPs’ solidarity and bring them together. But a counter-argument might 
suggest that hardship could instigate conflicts and hostility because of the lack of resources 
and because of the stress. Thus, we argue that the traditional leaders played important role on 
mitigating such hostilities by mediating disputes and solving problems while promoting 
socio-cultural values of cooperation and solidarity. This was substantiated by the discussions 
in the interviews with the community leaders of the camp. The presence of the people 
together in one location also created the chance to know each other, besides, the presence of 
the organizations that provided services to the IDPs. Looking at these circumstances we can 
elicit that they are not strong enough by themselves to affect the IDPs rate of participation. 
Rather, the traditional leaders are the most critical factor given their existential influence on 
their communities and the type of cultural and social authority they wield on their 
communities.  This point was validated by the fact they are the primary source of 
consultation to direct the activities of the organizations in the camp. 
In short, the data confirm that the integration of the traditional leaders in the 
governmental and non-governmental institutions has contributed to promoting popular 
participation in the camp. This, indeed, in combination with the presence and the efforts 
made by these organizations through providing training and knowledge, financial and 
administrative support, and organizing them in coordinating bodies, service committees, and 
administrative entities.  
In regards to the results of the interviews, the questions asked in the semi-structured 
interviews explore the potentiality of stability and nation-building that could result from the 
increased popular participation through an integrated traditional leadership. The plausibility 
of this potential could be traced in the different manifestations of social peace in the camp. 
For example, Abd Allah Adoma, the Fur tribe chief, stated that there are many cases of 
intermarriages which were aggressively refused before. He said “in our tribe it was 
considered a huge shame that one could be rejected or killed, if he or she married someone 
from different tribe, but now it is a commonplace and even blessed by the leaders.” (See the 
appendix).  The phenomenon of the intermarriage was mentioned several times by different 
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participants in the interviews. Moreover, Adoma discussed different manifestation of the 
social peace, he stated “when the Christians from the southern tribes have an occasion, they 
invite us, the Muslims, and have someone to slaughter a sheep the Islamic way to guarantee 
that we will eat in their ceremonies”. (See the Appendix B). The participants also indicated 
that they collect money for the social ceremonies such as marriages and funerals in different 
tribe and work together to serve the guests in the ceremonies. 
Moreover, they highlighted that the younger people from different tribe dance many 
traditional dances of different tribes. Musa Khor Gamous, Nuba Sultan, Stated “Our children 
from the Dinka tribe dance Kiren, a Nuba traditional dance, you will see them in ceremonies 
and festivals” (See Appendix B). Furthermore, they indicated the role of the school in 
bringing the children together regardless of their tribal origins as was indicated by Hassan 
Juma Awad, the Hamar tribe Nazir/chief. Additionally, the participants mentioned the 
religious occasions as a manifestation of the social peace in the camp. They discussed how 
they organize public Ramadan Breakfasts and call upon all the people in the camp to join 
these public breakfasts regardless of their religions and tribes (Adoma, Fur tribe). Also, 
according to Sultan Tiya, Nuba tribe chief, the “ closed ethnic group has a poor reserve of 
knowledge and experience because they reject all others’ knowledge and experience, they 
have no learning tendency but here in the camp every one try to share his information and 
learn from the others” (Sultan Tiya Interview). They have realized that all of them have 
valuable information and experiences which they need and can utilize. This is a powerful 
testimony for the potentiality of inter-communal interaction as a means of nation-building 
facilitated by the integrated traditional leadership. 
Moreover, Musa Khur Gamous also mentioned that there is exchange in meals which 
were used to be traditional tribal meals.  They also indicated the economic exchange as a 
means of social interaction. For example Hassan Juma Awad, the Hamar tribe Nazir, stated 
that: “our tribe is very famous with having good construction skills, so we help the people in 
other tribes to build their houses for reasonable wage” (see the appendix). In this regard, 
Samo Salih the active individual from Nuba tribe discussed that many tribes have some skills 
and activities and they exchange them in the market without frictions or problems. He 
mentioned example for that as water, wood selling, coal, washing and ironing, retails, etc.In 
 76 
addition, the participants also mentioned the hard conditions and difficulties they face as 
displaced people as the catalyst of their cooperation and interconnectedness (Traiza Danieal, 
Baria tribe, and Peter Bouth, Nuer tribe). Traiza Danieal also mentioned the Women Groups 
and their neighborhood support groups where women from different tribes meet regularly, 
exchange visits, talk about family issues, and discuss social problems in the neighborhoods 
and raise fund or collect items for the needy women despite the tribal backgrounds. She also 
indicated that for the festivals and ceremonies, they collect money, work for together, and 
dance many traditional dances despite the tribal backgrounds.  Moreover, they mentioned 
how the charitable agencies and NGOs played role in organizing their activities and making 
them work without bias in the camp (Samo Salih, Nuba and Regina, Shilluk tribe). This, 
indeed, is done through consultation with the traditional leaders and consideration of their 
advices and views. 
Thus, the integration of traditional leaders in democratic institutions is a forceful tool 
to increase participation at the local level which, if organized in the right direction, would 
promote inter-communal interaction and promote nation-building.  
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CHAPTER 6.  LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Despite the tremendous diversity in Africa, there are significant socio-political 
similarities among its countries. Historically, African societies had analogous social and 
cultural structures. This fact, combined with a shared legacy of colonialism, resulted in 
comparable political features and relatively typical social experiences. Traditional leadership 
with its pivotal role is one of the features the African societies have in common. Therefore, 
the issue of their interaction with the political system and their socio-cultural role is relevant 
to each African country. Although some of the African countries are still grappling with 
socio-political problems, others have made significant advancement toward a path of stability 
and democratic governance. Thus, as a way of learning and exchanging experiences, it is of 
substantial importance to examine the political experiences on the continent, especially those 
that have infamously experimented with the issue of integrated traditional leadership and its 
influence on socio-political dynamics. Hence, this chapter discusses the experiences of 
Namibia, Botswana, Nigeria, and South Africa to elicit lessons and demarcate general 
directions for future projects of democratization and nation building based on popular 
participation and grass-roots level involvement in development. 
The strongly influential status of traditional leadership in Botswana continued to exert 
the same status during colonialism wherein traditional leadership did not experience 
fundamental deformation as the case in many African countries. With the persistent existence 
of traditional leaders and their durable socio-cultural influence, the ruling parties 
incorporated these leaders in their political activities. This resulted in successful electoral 
results where the political ideology was allied with cultural identity of the people. The unique 
marriage between the political dynamics and cultural symbolism produced a cohesiveness of 
socio-political process (Dusing, 2000). Although Botswana fostered an ethnically 
assimilationist state with one dominant ethnic party, the incorporation of traditional 
leadership as a tool for constructing common national identity supports this research thesis 
and offers practical lessons to be considered. That is, one should realize the vast cultural 
multiplicity of Sudan is an omnipresent characteristic feature of its society. Therefore, this 
multiplicity should determine the integration of traditional leadership in a national structure 
in a way that maintains cultural pluralism and protects the rights of groups and individuals. 
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Additionally, the administrative structure at the local level and the functions assigned 
to traditional leaders could be of a great benefit in regards to social and economic 
development activities. Botswana adopted a hierarchal structure in which economic and 
social responsibilities are distributed regionally where traditional leaders play significant 
managerial and consultation roles (Keulder, 1998). Sudan has a wide range of traditional 
communities, each exhibiting its unique cultural and social characteristics that are shaped by 
the physical environment that mutually impacts this environment. Thus, developmental 
activities need to be community-specific and must be established upon prior socio-cultural 
investigation and socio-economic research to interpret the needs of the communities on their 
own terms. The experience of Botswana in this regard supports this research’s previous point 
about integrating traditional leadership in local and regional government for consultation and 
information purposes to fulfill this condition. 
When examining Namibia, it can be seen that Namibian society has adopted a 
multiculturalist state under a “unity in diversity” slogan. During the political process of 
nation building, the multiethnic party coalition targeted local ethnic identities and enforced 
their party on the networks and built leaders with alliance with the traditional leaders. This 
resulted in bringing about ethnic fragmentation in the political process but, at the same time, 
it prevented the domination of one group in the state. Thus, the traditional structure serves 
more in oppositional channels of governance. In addition, a constitutional-only recognition of 
traditional leadership has served the symbolism of cultural and social diversity of the 
Namibian society. However, at the same time, the traditional leadership was relegated to the 
ultural sphere only and was barred from partaking in local government activities and issues 
of development (Dusing, 2000). This offers a valuable lesson for Sudan and supports this 
research thesis, that the integration of traditional leadership in local practical issues has the 
potential to serve as a powerful tool for popular participation and nation building. The 
fragmentation transmitted to the political process by the local ethnic cleavages in Namibia 
could have its justification in an alienated traditional leadership from the practical and 
developmental sphere to make it more rhetorical and symbolic. Thus, in Sudan one can 
advocate that greater involvement of traditional leadership in practical issues leads to a more 
interactive, participatory, and cohesive national political process. That is because cultural 
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symbolism should serve as medium for interaction and recognition which will be transformed 
into increasingly empirical projects.  
As shown in Namibia, ethnic nationalism is the strongest force to challenge the 
project of multicultural state and nation-building in South Africa. In the transitional period, 
traditional leadership strongly applied for power bargaining. It was ascertained that the Zulu-
dominated party did not build a modern party organization and still relies on traditional 
leadership to reach its rural areas. The central authority deals with traditional elites as 
custodians of culture and tradition. Thus, the elites’ demands for cultural groups’ rights, 
under a pluralist label, provide chances for ethnically rooted power bases. As in the case in 
Namibia, the constitutional recognition of the cultural groups’ rights did not provide political 
and practical tools for traditional leaders to participate. Thus, their role is relegated to cultural 
symbolism allowing consultation and advisory tasks at the provincial level. Unlike 
Botswana, this recognition for diversity did not threat the unity of the nation and the 
cohesiveness of the political process (Dusing, 2000). From this experience, one can argue 
that Sudan should learn from the fact that traditional leadership plays symbolic and advisory 
role to sustain diversity and cultural groups’ rights based on constitutional recognition. 
However, it should avoid relegating the traditional leadership to symbolic positions only, and 
promote more administrative and developmental functions. This will consolidate the 
democratic process by strengthening the democratic aspects of traditional leadership through 
more engagement in local democratic processes to connect the local community with the 
national state.  
In regards to Nigeria, many steps have been taken to enhance the performance of the 
local government resembled in traditional leadership. Yet, continuous interference from the 
center has weakened the exercise of power of the traditional leaders. This makes the position 
of the traditional leaders ironic because, on one hand, recognition of their power and their 
influence on their people resulted in a level of stability and strengthened the legitimacy. On 
the other hand, it was perceived as a hindering structure that prevents the process of nation-
building and economic growth. The traditional leaders in Nigeria participate tremendously on 
the local administrative activities through their networks. More importantly, they mobilize 
the public for development programs while maintaining cultural and ceremonial 
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responsibilities. On the national level, they participate in State Councils, and assess and 
collect taxes. It was noted that, when the law designated tax collection as the governments’ 
officials’ task, the taxes were not collected for two months. That is because the traditional 
leaders used to initiate campaigns for tax collection as part of a cultural program (Keulder, 
1998). This substantiates the research’s thesis that the central state’s attitude towards 
traditional leaders is critical to play a positive role at the local and national level. When the 
central state and the “modernizing” forces tried to undermine the traditional leadership and 
did not serve their aim, it hindered local administrative and developmental activities. In 
Sudan, a similar argument can be made that the denial or attempts to undermine traditional 
communities generatee problems at the local level, and these problems affected the national 
level as discussed in the previous sections. 
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CHAPTER 7.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The theory guiding this study has proposed that the integration of the traditional 
leaders in a national structure would increase the popular participation. The premise was 
based on the fact that traditional leaders exert tremendous influence on their communities. 
The theory was also based on the fact that legitimacy of leadership and its appeal is a critical 
element in the relationship between traditional leaders and their communities. To satisfy this 
appeal, legitimacy is necessarily driven and maintained by cultural values and social norms 
of the community. There is an interactive dialectic relationship that extends to shape the 
relationship between the leaders and their communities through a reciprocated relationship 
between the communities’ members who assert the leaders’ tasks and provide them with their 
power. The theory was also established on the observation that the traditional communities 
need to be dealt with as integrated whole, with parts that complement one another in 
dynamically interactive relationships to produce a community with its organization and 
characteristics. That is, social and cultural systems are intricately woven by economic, 
environmental and the spiritual threads that lay the complex web of the community which is 
influenced by its historical experience and situated in its physical world.  
This theoretical concept dictates specific implications when addressing traditional 
communities’ issues of representation, participation, development and governance. This is 
especially important in pluralist societies with socio-cultural cleavages and socio-political 
divisions that led to complicated problems of poverty, civil war, and lack of development. 
These problems, with application of specific theoretical framework, are plausibly traced to 
the origin of a lack of representation in a national structure that enables the traditional 
communities’ participation to meet their demands. The lack of representation also results in 
the absence of the required financial and administrative facilities that promote local activities 
and projects that mobilize the community to manage its resources and protect its livelihood 
through local organized entities. This, in turn, prevents a regular systematic input from the 
local traditional communities on the central government; which, in fact, perpetuates their 
local problems and renders them vulnerable to the central authority’s abuse and violations. 
The problem of representation is explained by this research’s theory when realizing that the 
traditional communities’ representation includes the recognition and respect of their 
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worldviews, their socio-cultural values and norms, and their right to pursue their favorable 
livelihoods. This includes their social and cultural rights to maintain their belief systems and 
to exercise their socio-economic activities in ways they perceive are compatible within their 
physical and virtual world. Thus, the integration of traditional leaders in a national 
democratic structure is necessary to represent traditional communities and facilitate their 
participation through a means promote development at the local level and link the 
communities to the central authority as a crucial condition of good governance. 
On another level, the problem of representation of traditional communities in a 
national structure results in fragmentation of the society as whole and breeds hostile relations 
between its groupings of people. That is because the problems of resource management and 
lack of development create frictions and scarcity of facilities which leads to conflicts. In 
addition, a passive or negative central authority prevents the public’s identification with the 
central authority which is important as this identification is indicative of the legitimacy and 
representational power of the central authority. A lack of identification contributes to the 
fragmentation of society and weakens its common ground for belonging to a national entity. 
Therefore, the integration of traditional leaders plays substantial role in eliminating the 
hostility and fragmentation of society in many ways. First, it enables the implementation of 
developmental programs since traditional leaders voice the concerns of their communities. 
This voice can prevents conflict over resources and alleviate poverty problems. Second, the 
integration of traditional leaders in a national structure facilitates communication and 
motivates greater inter-communal interaction by providing institutional means to exchange 
experience and cultures, which promotes solidarity and social support. Third, the traditional 
leaders’ representation in a national structure symbolizes a unified national identity that 
embraces diversity and cultural multiplicity of the Sudanese society. This supports the 
mutual recognition and respect of traditional communities among each other. Conversely, it 
would compel the central authority to recognize this diversity and consider the community 
regarding its political conduct. 
More importantly, to achieve integration of traditional leaders in a nationalal structure 
with its anticipated outcomes, the attitude of the central authority is a decisive determining 
factor regarding the outcomes of such process. A supportive central authority that pursues a 
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constructive relationship with traditional leaders and maneuvers to integrate them in a 
national structure would generate integrated traditional leaders with positive productive roles 
in their local communities and on the national level. The role of the central authority 
includes, but is not limited to, providing administrative and financial support for this process. 
By examining the Sudanese traditional leaders’ roles in the socio-political dynamics 
of Sudan in a longitudinal study, the researcher found that traditional leaders continued to 
influence events substantially. They were paramount elements of the Sudanese communities’ 
structure. Taking the importance of the traditional leaders as proxy for their integration in a 
national structure, the researcher deduced that such process would lead to significant results 
if conducted in an informed, prudent manner. Through a study of successive eras in Sudan’s 
history, the role of the central authority determined the outcomes of the traditional leaders’ 
roles. In the pre-colonial periods, the permissive and cooperative nature of the central 
authority allowed positive outcomes of traditional leaders ‘roles wherein they led educational 
activities along with other community programs of social support. When the central authority 
of the Turkish rule antagonized the traditional leaders, it instigated competition between 
them and changed their relationship with their communities to a more polarizing and 
recruiting one. Additionally, when Al-Mahdi initiated his movement, his recognition and 
respect of the traditional leaders enabled the success of his movement and carried it to a 
massive national movement that ended colonial rule and established a national state. 
Moreover, when the British repressed the Sudanese society, traditional leaders were less able 
to influence the political scene. This was altered when the British allowed more room for 
traditional leaders, especial when it needed their collaboration for international strategies 
during the World War I and II. Furthermore, after independence, the power centers shifted to 
shape a new political scenario within the country, where power was concentrated in the urban 
areas and rural areas represented the disadvantaged segments of the country. This is an 
important elaboration because the rural areas correspond with traditional communities—the 
subject of this study. The shift of power resulted in rural-urban discrepancies and produced 
the social ailments of poverty, unemployment, conflict, and civil war.This research espoused 
that the lack of representation of these traditional communities was the origin of such 
ailments; therefore, the traditional leaders of these communities should be involved in a 
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national structure. The research explored the attitudes of the various central authorities and 
revealed that the central authority determines the outcome of traditional leaders’ roles in their 
communities.  
Furthermore, it was inferred that, through the eras studied in this research, imposing 
traditional leaders from outside the community to control the generally results in 
counterproductive outcomes on the local and the national level. In addition, imposing 
worldviews on traditional communities as a way to gain unification is a dangerous strategy 
and generally leads to conflict and destruction. Excluding traditional leaders from the 
political process is a hindering, rather than constructive move because it excludes the 
potential of a larger mobilization and stronger legitimacy. Considering the previous points, 
integration of traditional leaders leads to the increase of popular participation at the local 
level and would facilitates engagement on the national level. The anticipated product of 
participation is programs of development and socio-cultural activism. Integrated leaders will 
facilitate an inter-communal interaction and promote a symbolism of national cultural 
identity embracing the diversity of the society. 
This research is substantiated through the experience of Jabarona camp for the 
internally displaced people, wherein the traditional leaders led the socio-economic and socio-
cultural activities of the camp. Their significant influence, enabled by the financial and 
administrative support of national and international organizations, led to high, popular 
participation in the camp and social peace where the various cultural groups cooperated 
harmoniously in running the activities of the camp. Furthermore, learning from the 
experiences of other African countries helps to demarcate the appropriate direction toward 
the process of integration of traditional leaders’ in Sudan. 
Future research should investigate how to technically construct the national structure 
that integrates traditional leaders. There is also a need for research on the socio-cultural 
elements that support and promote engagement in local and national activities to determine 
strategies for emphasizing such elements in national programs. Further research should also 
be conducted to learn more about traditional communities to facilitate their integration in an 
appropriate manner.  
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Recommendations 
Future policy needs to target promoting the representation of traditional communities 
as a means to alleviate the problems resulting from rural-urban discrepancies, especially the 
disadvantages of their traditional communities. The integration of traditional leaders should 
motivate direction in policymaking that fosters the following goals: 
• Conduct prior research that investigates traditional communities as 
interconnected parts for each development program within traditional 
communities.  
• Encourage and support organizations and institutions for development that 
involve people of different origin in order to the course of social interaction in 
the track that leads to integration.  
• Organize national conferences for traditional leaders to discuss their issues of 
concern. 
• Involve the people and organize them in government, pubic activities through 
involvement of traditional leaders in such programs .This would help in 
embracing diversity and enhancing the spirit of nationalism. 
• Encourage activities and programs that strengthen national ties, e.g. national 
contests among schools, youth tours, open cultural dialogues, etc. 
• Create encouraging governmental policies for interaction to develop tribal 
interrelationships through local-level inter-tribal coordinating committees. 
• Procure financial support for organization, training, and interaction activities 
among these entities. 
• Implement development projects that are administrated by and target people 
of different tribal origins, especially in areas of tribal friction and tension over 
resources. 
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APPENDIX A.  DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE CAMP 
A-1 Age 
 Age 
Range 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 
Number 13 13 14 8 2 
Percentage 26% 26% 28% 16% 4% 
A-2 Education 
 Education 
Range Illiterate Some Primary 
Primary 
completion 
Some 
Secondary 
Secondary 
completion 
Post 
secondary 
Number 27 4 8 5 6 - 
Percentage 54% 8% 16% 10% 12% 0% 
A-3 Profession before displacement 
 Profession 
Range Herder Farmer Merchant workers Housewives Student Military Unemployed 
Number 9 14 1 3 12 10 1 - 
Percentage 18% 28% 2% 6% 24% 20% 2% - 
A-4 Reasons of displacement 
 Reason 
Range War Draught Seeking work Other 
Number 24 10 8 8 
Percentage 48% 20% 16% 16% 
A-5 Profession after displacement 
 Profession 
Range Herder Farmer workers Housewife Student Military merchant Unemployed 
Number - - 20 11 4 5 4 6 
Percentage - - 40% 22% 8% 10% 8% 12% 
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A-6 Dispute within the tribe 
Dispute Before Displacement After Displacement 
Case Yes No Yes No 
Number 1 49 2 48 
Percentage 2% 98% 4% 96% 
A-7 Disputing tribes 
Tribe Number of Cases  
Dinka 6 
Nuba 8 
Messairia 6 
Nuer 9 
Masaleet 4 
A-8 Disputes and conflicts with another tribe 
Dispute  Before displacement After displacement 
Case Yes No Yes No 
Number 33 17 2 48 
Percentage 66% 34% 4% 96% 
A-9 Mechanisms for solving social problems and disputes 
Mechanism Tribal Leader Common Court Police 
Number 12 34 4 
Percentage 24% 68% 8% 
A-10 Membership in organized bodies 
Membership  Before displacement After displacement 
Case Yes No Yes No 
Number - 50 43 7 
Percentage 0% 100% 86% 14% 
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A-11 Membership in organized bodies after displacement 
 Number of Memberships in Organized Bodies 
Range Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight None 
Number 13 12 7 3 4 2 2 7 
Percentage 26% 24% 14% 6% 8% 4% 4% 14% 
A-12 Affiliation with political party 
Affiliated Yes No 
Number 22 28 
Percentage 44% 56% 
Active Yes No 
Number 9 13 
Percentage 18% 26% 
A-13 Involvement in religious activities 
 Regular performance 
Range Yes Sometimes No 
Number 16 20 14 
Percentage 32% 40% 28% 
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APPENDIX B.  PHOTOS 
 
Omdurman Battle 1898 
 
The Mahiyya Kailfa and his assistant died in the 1899 Umm Diwbaykarat battle 
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Mahdiyya army prisoners after the Omdurman battle 
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Ali Dinar, the last Sultan (King) of Darfur Kingdom  
after the British conquest in 1916 
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Othman Digna, the Mahdist leader in Eastern Sudan who was  
arrested by the British in 1900 
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The Mahdya revolution leader, Imam Al-Mahdi, and his sons and capturers 
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Three of the four sons of the Mahdi: Sayyed Abd Alrahman (center) 
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Abu Sin, appointed Chief of Sudanese traditional leaders during British rule in 1928 
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Fur Kingdom leaders soon after the British conquest 
 97 
 
 
Leaders of the White Flag League, a youth movement for independence in 1924 
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